An End-to-End Measurement of Certificate Revocation in the Web's PKI

Liu, Yabing; Tome, Will; Zhang, Liang; Choffnes, David; Levin, Dave; Maggs, Bruce M.; Mislove, Alan; Schulman, Aaron; Wilson, Christo

doi:10.1145/2815675.2815685

Cited by 113 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Short-lived, multisigned certificates greatly reduce the need for a revocation system, but do not completely suppress it. Given that designing a satisfactory revocation system has proven to be an extremely challenging task [25,38,39], we consider it to go beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the security of BlockPKI can be further improved by combining it with any existing revocation scheme.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

BlockPKI: An Automated, Resilient, and Transparent Public-Key Infrastructure

Dykcik

Chuat

Szałachowski³

et al. 2018

2018 IEEE International Conference on Data Mining Workshops (ICDMW)

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This paper describes BlockPKI, a blockchain-based public-key infrastructure that enables an automated, resilient, and transparent issuance of digital certificates. Our goal is to address several shortcomings of the current TLS infrastructure and its proposed extensions. In particular, we aim at reducing the power of individual certification authorities and make their actions publicly visible and accountable, without introducing yet another trusted third party. To demonstrate the benefits and practicality of our system, we present evaluation results and describe our prototype implementation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

BlockPKI: An Automated, Resilient, and Transparent Public-Key Infrastructure

Dykcik

Chuat

Szałachowski³

et al. 2018

2018 IEEE International Conference on Data Mining Workshops (ICDMW)

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“…Even though use of CRLs is limited to revoking certificates, rather than allowing for more complex updates, their size, which is linear in the number of revocations, can become quite large. The median certificate has a revocation list on the order of 50 KB, and CRLs of several megabytes are not uncommon [1]. We saw in Section XII that the amount of information required to verify the status of a user's identity against an up-to-date r IV,t is logarithmic in the number of IV s users, on the order of 1 KB.…”

Section: Comparison Of Revocation Mechanism Tomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, as shown in [1], a number of widely used, modern browsers accept revoked certificates in certain circumstances. In contrast, note that our update mechanism is integrated into the issuing system so that checking that a record is up-to-date is done in the same process as checking that that record exists at all.…”

Section: Comparison Of Revocation Mechanism Tomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, in such a system, it can be difficult for the issuer to update or revoke the document if there are changes to the user's identity. Issuers can create revocation lists, such as the ones used in public key infrastructures, but using these lists can pose subtle challenges [1]. We will propose a system for this setting that uses properties of blockchains to provide for streamlined, integrated revocation and updating of identities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Transforming Face-to-Face Identity Proofing into Anonymous Digital Identity Using the Bitcoin Blockchain

Augot

Chabanne

Clemot

et al. 2017

2017 15th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST)

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The most fundamental purpose of blockchain technology is to enable persistent, consistent, distributed storage of information. Increasingly common are authentication systems that leverage this property to allow users to carry their personal data on a device while a hash of this data is signed by a trusted authority and then put on a blockchain to be compared against. For instance, in 2015, MIT introduced a schema for the publication of their academic certificates based on this principle. In this work, we propose a way for users to obtain assured identities based on face-to-face proofing that can then be validated against a record on a blockchain. Moreover, in order to provide anonymity, instead of storing a hash, we make use of a scheme of Brands to store a commitment against which one can perform zero-knowledge proofs of identity. We also enforce the confidentiality of the underlying data by letting users control a secret of their own. We show how our schema can be implemented on Bitcoin's blockchain and how to save bandwidth by grouping commitments using Merkle trees to minimize the number of Bitcoin transactions that need to be sent. Finally, we describe a system in which users can gain access to services thanks to the identity records of our proposal.

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“…Unfortunately, the deployment and effectiveness of this technique depend on the server configuration (e.g., the age of a stapled response can be customized by a configuration parameter, which may introduce a long attack window). Liu et al reported [29] that only 3% of certificates are served by servers supporting OCSP Stapling. Moreover, OCSP and OCSP Stapling only return the status of a single certificate (not the entire chain).…”

Section: The Evolution Of Revocation Schemes and Their Drawbacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

PKI Safety Net (PKISN): Addressing the Too-Big-to-Be-Revoked Problem of the TLS Ecosystem

Szałachowski¹,

Chuat²,

Perrig³

2016

2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)

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In a public-key infrastructure (PKI), clients must have an efficient and secure way to determine whether a certificate was revoked (by an entity considered as legitimate to do so), while preserving user privacy. A few certification authorities (CAs) are currently responsible for the issuance of the large majority of TLS certificates. These certificates are considered valid only if the certificate of the issuing CA is also valid. The certificates of these important CAs are effectively too big to be revoked, as revoking them would result in massive collateral damage. To solve this problem, we redesign the current revocation system with a novel approach that we call PKI Safety Net (PKISN), which uses publicly accessible logs to store certificates (in the spirit of Certificate Transparency) and revocations. The proposed system extends existing mechanisms, which enables simple deployment. Moreover, we present a complete implementation and evaluation of our scheme.

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An End-to-End Measurement of Certificate Revocation in the Web's PKI

Cited by 113 publications

References 17 publications

BlockPKI: An Automated, Resilient, and Transparent Public-Key Infrastructure

BlockPKI: An Automated, Resilient, and Transparent Public-Key Infrastructure

Transforming Face-to-Face Identity Proofing into Anonymous Digital Identity Using the Bitcoin Blockchain

PKI Safety Net (PKISN): Addressing the Too-Big-to-Be-Revoked Problem of the TLS Ecosystem

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