An Energy Efficient and Formally Secured Certificate-Based Signcryption for Wireless Body Area Networks with the Internet of Things

Abstract

Recently, the spectacular innovations in the fields of wireless body area networks (WBAN) and the Internet of Things (IoT) have made e-Care services rise as a promising application domain, which significantly advances the quality of the medical system, however, due to the openness of the wireless environment and privacy of people's physiological data, WBAN and IoT are prone to various cyber-a acks. There is a significant need for an efficient and highly secured cryptographic scheme that can meet the requirements of resource-constrained devices. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a certificate-based signcryption (CB-SN) scheme for the IoT-enabled WBAN. The proposed scheme is based on the concept of hyper-elliptic curve cryptography (HECC) that offers the same level of security as the elliptic curve and bilinear pairing with lower-key size. The formal security verification using the Automated Validation of the Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool along with informal security analysis demonstrate that the proposed scheme is not just reducing the complexity of resource-constrained IoT devices, but proves to be secure against several well-known cryptographic a acks. Moreover, performance comparison with relevant existing schemes authenticates that the proposed scheme is far more secure and energy efficient. different algorithms separately, i.e., signature and then encryption at the same time. In 1997, Zheng was the pioneer to merge these two processes in one algorithm, called signcryption [7]. This scheme is based on the concept of old public key cryptography (PKC), which is suffering from certificate overheads, renewing, and revocation problems [8]. Shamir was the first to propose an alternate concept of PKC, called identity-based cryptography (IBC) [9]. This technique removed the limitations of PKC and used the identity in place of a certificate. Later, in 2002, Malone-Lee [10], for the first time merged the concept of IBC with the signcryption technique, namely, identity-based signcryption (IBS). The IBS includes three entities, for example, a sender (signcrypter), a receiver (unsigncrypter), and the private key generation center (PKGC), respectively. In this setup, the users (signcrypter and unsigncrypter) generate their identities and after that, send it to the PKGC. Then, the PKGC produces and delivers the private keys for all the participating users, by using the secured networks. Unfortunately, IBS suffers from the key escrow issue (KEI), because the private key is generated by the PKGC and one can easily use this key for forging the digital signature and decrypting the ciphertext [11].To eliminate the above problem in IBS, in 2008, Barbosa and Farshim [12], put forward the concept of a certificateless signcryption (CL-SC) scheme. The CL-SC mechanism almost works the same as IBS, but the main difference is that the private key is generated by the users themselves. The central authority known as a key generation center (KGC) only provides the partial private key to the users by using an ...

A Lightweight and Secured Certificate-Based Proxy Signcryption (CB-PS) Scheme for E-Prescription Systems

“…The proxy verifies the public key of receiver from the following steps [8], if the public key of the receiver is successfully derived then it further generates the proxy signcryption.…”

“…Case 2: The UP can also develop a secret key if he computes equation (8). This process needs the private key sp of a smart pharmacy from equation (8).…”

“…Case 2: The UP can also develop a secret key if he computes equation (8). This process needs the private key sp of a smart pharmacy from equation (8). Therefore, it is also hard and infeasible for the UP to get the smart pharmacy private key sp from equation 9because it is equal to solving the hyper elliptic curve discrete logrithm problem.…”

“…The IDBC is affected by the key escrow problem; it means that if private key generation center (PKG) is malicious then he can easily generate a forge signature on the behalf of actual users, because in IDBC the PKG produces the private key for users [7]. The CC is designed to overcome the key escrow flaw of IDBC, in which the key generation center (KGC) makes the partial private key and distribute it by using secure channel that can also a problem [8]. Here, for removing the aforementioned flaws, one such solution is certificate-based cryptography (CBC) is available [9], which enables the users to generate their public and private key by themselves.…”

An Efficient and Provably Secure Certificateless Blind Signature Scheme for Flying Ad-Hoc Network Based on Multi-Access Edge Computing

“…, Islam et al's scheme[47], Nayak et al's scheme[48], and Chen et al's scheme[49]. For the comparison, we supposed that, | | = 1024 bits, | | = 160 bits, | n| = 80 bits, |H| = 512 bits, | | = 1024 bits, and | | = 1024 bits[70]. According to our suppositions, the communication cost for Lei et al's scheme [4] is 4| | + 2| | + |H| + | |, for Islam et al's scheme [47] is 2| | + | |, for Nayak et al's scheme [48] is 2| | + | |, for Chen et al's scheme [49] is | | + |H| + | |, and for our proposed scheme is | n| + |H| + | |.The reduction in communication cost of our proposed CL-BS scheme compared with the existing ones as provided inFigure 7is shown by following degrees: from Lei et al's scheme[4] at (4| | + 2| | + |H| + | |) − (| n| + |H| + | |)/(4| | + 2| | + |H| + | |) = (4224 − 1616/4224 × 100 = 61.74%); from Islam et al's scheme [47] at (2| | + | |) − (| n| + |H| + | |)/(2| | + | |) = (3072 − 1616/3072 × 100 = 47.39%); from Nayak et al's scheme [48] at (2| | + |H| + | |) − (| n| + |H| + | |)/(2| | + |H| + | |) = (1856 − 1616/1856 × 100 = 14.8%); and from Chen et al's scheme [49] at (| | + |H| + | |) − (| n| + |H| + | |)/(| | + |H| + | |) = (2560 − 1616/2560 × 100 = 36.78%).…”