An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning

Osman, Magda

doi:10.3758/bf03196730

Cited by 349 publications

(277 citation statements)

References 191 publications

(293 reference statements)

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“…In recent years, however, more attention has been given to dual-processing models, which recognise a heuristic, impulsive, and reactive mode, in addition to the reasoned mode (Evans, 2008). Although the assumption that people may rely on both types of processing is not new (Osman, 2004), its application to health behaviours is novel (Gerrard, Gibbons, Houlihan, Stock, & Pomery, 2008).…”

Section: Psychosocial Approaches To Smokingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The relationship between smoker and nonsmoker prototypes and smoking status among 14-year-old Norwegians

Skalle¹,

Rise²

2006

Addictive Behaviors

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Section: Psychosocial Approaches To Smokingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The relationship between smoker and nonsmoker prototypes and smoking status among 14-year-old Norwegians

Skalle¹,

Rise²

2006

Addictive Behaviors

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“…[ Dual-process and dual-system theories are not without their critics (see: Keren & Schul, 2009;Osman, 2004). Readers are referred to Evans and Stanovich for a detailed consideration of the debate (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a&b); suffice to say Evans and Stanovich conclude that although dual-process theory is an "evolving project" the evidence in its favour is "compelling" and a "very clear theoretical basis for the two-process distinction has now emerged" (2013a: 237).…”

Section: Theorising Entrepreneurial Intuitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Stanovich and West (2000) enumerated no less than twelve distinct variants of the generic dual model but noted "clear family resemblances" (p.658) to the extent that irrespective of the differences they all "essentially posit two minds in one brain" (Evans 2003: 454). Dual-process theories are well-placed to illuminate the role of intuitive Entrepreneurial intuition 7 processing in entrepreneurs' business venturing decisions given the insights they offer into the joint roles of cognition and affect.[ Dual-process and dual-system theories are not without their critics (see: Keren & Schul, 2009;Osman, 2004). Readers are referred to Evans and Stanovich for a detailed consideration of the debate (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a&b); suffice to say Evans and Stanovich conclude that although dual-process theory is an "evolving project" the evidence in its favour is "compelling" and a "very clear theoretical basis for the two-process distinction has now emerged" (2013a: 237).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of intuition in entrepreneurship and business venturing decisions

Sadler‐Smith

2015

European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology

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Entrepreneurial intuition is the affectively-charged recognition and evaluation of a business venturing opportunity arising as a result of involuntary, rapid, non-conscious, associative processing. This article integrates theories of dual-processing and models of business venturing (opportunity recognition, evaluation and exploitation) in a 'default-intervention model of entrepreneurial intuition' which links the defaults of intuitive expertise, cognitive style, somatic state and the affect heuristic with System 2 interventions and the contingencies of the decision environment. Six research propositions are offered with suggestions for how they can be tested. The theoretical and practical implications of entrepreneurial intuition are discussed in terms of the unfolding of a research agenda relating to this important but undertheorized and under-researched construct in work and organizational psychology.Keywords: decision-making; dual-process; dual-system; entrepreneurship; intuition Entrepreneurial intuition 2 INTRODUCTIONEntrepreneurship is the 'engine room' of the economy (Mitchell, 2005), and successful entrepreneurs often attribute their accomplishments to the 'knack' of being able to identify and judge business opportunities 'intuitively'. The popular business press is replete with examples of entrepreneurs crediting their successes to 'instinct' (Mehta, 2013), 'hunch' (Barrow, 2009), or 'gut feel' (Welch & Byrne, 2001). But should the claims of such 'intuitive entrepreneurs' be taken with a pinch of salt? On the other hand how much do behavioural scientists know about intuition's role in the recognition, evaluation, and exploitation of business opportunities? This article addresses these questions by: developing a model of intuitive processing in business venturing decisions; offering a number of research propositions and empirical directions; discussing the theoretical and practical significance of an improved understanding of 'entrepreneurial intuition'. This research is part of an on-going endeavour to "put the person back into entrepreneurship research" (Rauch & Frese, 2007: 353), further explaining the differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs and between successful and unsuccessful business venturing decisions (e.g. Utsch & Rauch, 2000), and connecting entrepreneurship research with wider debates and developments in the behavioural and brain sciences (e.g. Reimann & Bechara, 2010). BACKGROUNDThe proposed theoretical model integrates the construct of intuition with the process of entrepreneurship. Intuitions are involuntary "affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid non-conscious and holistic associations" (Dane & Pratt, 2007: 40). They are an outcome of variety of cognitive and affective processes (e.g. recognition, pattern matching, somatic marking) operating within and between a number of processing systems and subsystems (e.g. System 1 and System 2, Type 1 and Type 2) and brain regions (e.g. ventromedial pre-frontal cortex, amygdala) (Bechara & Damasio, 200...

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“…While there is a great variety of such accounts (surveyed in Stanovich 1999, Ch. 5;Osman 2004;Evans 2008;Evans and Frankish 2009), they share the basic idea that reasoning and cognition are accomplished by a confluence of two separate kinds of processes. Processes of the first kind (system-1) 16 For histories of dual-process accounts of cognition see Evans (2004) and Frankish and Evans (2009).…”

Section: Dual-process Theories Of Rationality and Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

Godden

2015

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This paper locates a common picture of argumentative rationality and identifies some implicit assumptions. Argumentative rationality is contrasted with dualprocess theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. I argue that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms, if they derive from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive processes. As a remedy, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning that retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying it.Résumé: On identifie une idée commune et fondamentale de la nature de la rationalité argumentative et une collection d'hypothèses implicites en elle. Ensuite on met en contraste la rationalité argumentative avec les théories de double processus de raisonnement et de la rationalité qui prévalent dans la psychologie du raisonnement. On soutient que la rationalité argumentative correspond bien seulement avec un système-2 de raisonnement dans les théories de double processus. Ce résultat remet en cause la force normative des normes argumentatives, si elles proviennent du tout de leur exactitude descriptive de nos processus cognitifs. Comme un remède, je propose une explication fondée sur l'activité de raisonnement qui retient les suppositions de la rationalité argumentative tout en re-contextualisant la relation entre le raisonnement comme une activité de justification et les états et les processus psychologiques qui sous-tendent cette activité.

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An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning

Cited by 349 publications

References 191 publications

The relationship between smoker and nonsmoker prototypes and smoking status among 14-year-old Norwegians

The relationship between smoker and nonsmoker prototypes and smoking status among 14-year-old Norwegians

The role of intuition in entrepreneurship and business venturing decisions

Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

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