An evaluation system for the physical security of computing systems

Criteria to evaluate Automated Personal Identification Mechanisms

“…The amount and diversity of criteria established from our work necessitated the classification of the criteria not only to present our results coherently but also to represent the main perspectives identified, which broadly align with three principles to evaluate APIMs (Warfel, 1979;Weingart et al, 1990): Risk management criteria category -Criteria in this category are designed to elicit information on the rationale and extent to which an APIM should protect an asset, or allow entitlement, commensurate with the risks and customs of the intended community; Requirements criteria Category -Criteria in this category are designed to elicit information regarding the degree of the identification reliability specified which should be consistent with the need; and Mechanism attributes criteria category -Criteria in this category are designed to elicit information regarding the APIM solution's ability to meet reliability requirements against the anticipated costs.…”

“…The Common Criteria, 2006 is a universally available evaluation framework for organisations to describe security requirements in the form of a Protection Profile, for a specific system or product (Target Of Evaluation) which may draw on interoperability standards (ISO/IEC 7816-4, 2005). The level of assurance sought for all APIMs should, in theory, match those required to control the identified risks (Weingart et al, 1990).…”

SAFE-OPS: An approach to embedded software security

“…Programs, or parts of the program, can be run (in an encrypted form) on these devices thus never revealing the code in the untrusted memory and thereby providing a tamper resistant execution environment for that portion of the code. A number of secure coprocessing solutions have been designed and proposed, including systems such as IBM's Citadel [White et al 1991], Dyad [Tygar and Yee 1993;Yee 1994;Yee and Tygar 1995], the Abyss and µAbyss systems [Weingart 1987;Weingart et al 1990;White and Comerford 1987], and the commercially available IBM 4758 which meets the FIPS 140-1 level 4 validation [IBM 2002;Smith 1996;Smith and Weingart 1999]. Distributed secure coprocessing is achieved by distributing a number of secure coprocessors and some have augmented the Kerberos system by integrating secure coprocessing into it [Itoi 2000].…”

Thinking Inside the Box: System-Level Failures of Tamper Proofing

“…To decrease the probability of successful attacks, Chaum suggested that inner-layer sensors be able to also detect tampering of outer layers. In 1990, Weingart et al [45] offered evaluation criteria for security modules, which take into account the environment and value of the protected modules; these criteria later formed the basis for NIST's FIPS 140-1. In 1999, Smith and Weingart [36] described the tamper proofing and the API design of the first FIPS 140 Level-4 approved security module, the IBM 4758.…”