An evolutionary analysis on the eﬀect of government policies on green R &amp; D of photovoltaic industry diﬀusion in complex network

Feng, Chen; Wu, Bin; Lou, Wen-Qian

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112217

Cited by 42 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…To our best knowledge, the recent literature about the strategic use of CSR can be summarized into three main streams as follows. First, the (altruistic) consumers have a higher willingness to pay for socially responsible products (García-Gallego and Geogantzís, 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Manasakies et al , 2013; Manasakies et al , 2014; Iyer and Soberman, 2016; Deng et al , 2020; Nayak et al , 2021; Chen et al , 2021) due to their intrinsic preferences on the socially responsible products, making firms to be more likely to engage in CSR activities. The main results of literature in this stream are basically the presence of altruistic consumers attracts firms to launch socially responsible products or/and do socially responsible innovation.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent studies on the strategic use of CSR generally take the heterogeneity of consumers’ preferences and/or firms’ abilities in CSR engagement into consideration. Specifically, there is a fraction of consumers in markets are altruistic and care more about the feature of social responsibility embodied in the products sold by firms (Manasakies et al , 2013; Manasakies et al , 2014; Iyer and Soberman, 2016; Deng et al , 2020; Nayak et al , 2021; Chen et al , 2021) [3]. By manufacturing and selling socially responsible products or innovating the existing basic products to be more socially responsible, firms can better meet the altruistic consumers’ expectations and effectively increase market share, strengthened market power can help the firms to earn a larger profit.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic corporate social responsibility with spillover effect in innovation

Liu

2022

NBRI

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate the motivation for firms to innovate their products to be socially responsible in the presence of the spillover effect. The follower of the innovation in corporate social responsibility (CSR) can benefit from the leader’s innovation by technological spillover. For instance, evidence can be found in the cosmetics industry (e.g. Lush Retail Ltd. and The Body Shop) and the market of hybrid electric vehicles (e.g. Toyota and Honda). Moreover, consumers may have different perceptions on the sequence of CSR innovation by firms, they may prefer more on the CSR product launched by the leader because they usually relate the desired stage to their interests when making a purchase decision. Therefore, the firms’ decision to be a leader of the CSR innovation depends on the trade-off between the loss in the spillover effect and the benefit of the first-mover advantage, which has not been considered by the existing literature. This paper explains the firms’ motivation on CSR innovation in a realistic situation where competing firms’ CSR programs are launched sequentially and sheds light on the private sector’s decision on strategy from the perspective on the social contribution, and provides some managerial implications about the competing firms’ strategies of launching the CSR innovation. Design/methodology/approach The authors construct a two-period Hotelling model in which consumers are divided into two groups: the altruistic and normal consumers. The altruistic consumers have more willingness to pay for the CSR product while the normal consumers only care about the product performance improved by the firms’ CSR activities. Firms have the option to innovate their basic products to be socially responsible and make their decision on such CSR innovation sequentially. Moreover, the follower of the innovation can receive a spillover effect from the leader, meaning that there may exist a second-mover advantage in terms of innovation (the authors define this as a spillover effect), but in the meanwhile, the altruistic consumers value more on the CSR product sold by the leader than that by the follower (the authors define this as a preference-reduction effect). This implies that the firm can benefit in the production process from being a second-mover of the CSR innovation but may lose its first-mover advantage in terms of the preference-reduction effect. By finding and analyzing the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, the authors try to figure out the firms’ decisions on CSR innovation in various situations. Findings The authors find that the firms’ motivation of CSR innovation crucially depends on the fraction of the altruistic consumers, as well as the spillover effect and the preference-reduction effect. A large (small) fraction of the altruistic consumers attracts (restricts) both the leader and the follower to engage in CSR innovation. More importantly, when such fraction is not too large but stays at a relatively high level, a potential leader of the CSR innovation may not wish to innovate. Hence, the potential follower may be the monopolist in the market of the socially responsible product. In addition, the authors reexamine this result in a variation model where a leader can make its decision on the CSR innovation to be more flexible by allowing it can innovate in either periods 1 or 2. The authors demonstrate that when the fraction of the altruistic consumers falls in an intermediate range, the leader may wish to delay the CSR innovation to period 2. In such a case, the leader of the CSR innovation may tend to trade its first-mover advantage for head-to-head competition with the follower and prevents the follower from benefiting from the spillover effect. Moreover, a flexible choice on the CSR innovation brings greater initiative to a firm to be the leader of the innovation. Originality/value Nearly all the studies about firms’ decisions on CSR innovation are conducted in an environment of simultaneous move, which is not appropriate to describe the real business world; many pieces of evidence show that many CSR programs are launched sequentially rather than simultaneously. The theory identifies a couple of important factors of the CSR innovation in a more realistic situation, i.e. sequential more on CSR innovation. Both spillover effect and preference-reduction effect crucially affect the firms’ decision on innovating their products to be socially responsible, which contributes to the existing literature in CSR and strategic decision. This paper also sheds some light on managerial implications with CSR innovation under various situations of competition.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic corporate social responsibility with spillover effect in innovation

Liu

2022

NBRI

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“…A positive attitude of the government is necessary for the implementation of GH incentives, and along with the provision of subsidies, regulation of the GH market is also necessary [ 24 ]. To this end, a comprehensive policy system is needed to promote the development of GH, and this system should include all aspects of planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of GH [ 25 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do Government Policies Promote Green Housing Diffusion in China? A Complex Network Game Context

Cao

Zhao

Xing

2022

IJERPH

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To reduce energy consumption and environmental pollution in the construction industry, many countries have focused on the development of green housing (GH), which is a type of green building for residential use. In China, the local governments have introduced various incentive policies to encourage the development of GH; however, its scale is still small and unevenly distributed. This implies a necessity to optimize the policies that apply to the GH incentive. To promote GH diffusion, we built an evolutionary game model on a complex network to analyze the impacts of government policies on GH pricing and demand and the profits of real estate enterprises developing GH. By implementing simulations, we further explored the incentive effect and operational mechanism of the government policies. The results show that the subsidy policy, the preferential policy for GH, and the restriction policy for ordinary housing can effectively promote the diffusion of GH to 0.6752, 0.506, and 0.5137 respectively. Meanwhile, the incentive effect of the enterprise subsidy policy and GH preferential policy gradually decreases with the increase in policy strength. In terms of the demand side, the consumer subsidy policy could promote GH diffusion to 0.7097. If the subsidy is below 120 CNY/m2, the effect of the consumer subsidy policy is less powerful than that of the enterprises subsidy policy; conversely, the former is slightly more effective than the latter. The outcome of the study has managerial implications on governmental decision-making, especially on the strategy design of incentive policies for GH.

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“…By modeling the tripartite evolutionary game for the low-carbon technology innovation among enterprises, governments and customers, Yuan et al [ 21 ] analyzed the impact of regulatory intensity and government subsidies on strategy evolution. Considering the different government incentives and regulations, Chen et al [ 22 ] studied the green R&D diffusion in the photovoltaic industry.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution analysis of low-carbon cooperation of service providers based on Moran process in cloud manufacturing

Han,

Lu,

Zhang

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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Low-carbon cooperation among cloud manufacturing service providers is one way to achieve carbon peak and neutrality. Such cooperation is related to the benefits to service providers adopting low-carbon strategies and stochastic factors such as government low-carbon policies, providers’ environmental awareness, and demanders’ low-carbon preferences. Focusing on the evolutionary process of service providers’ low-carbon strategy selection under uncertain factors, a stochastic evolutionary game model is constructed based on the Moran process, and the equilibrium conditions for low-carbon cooperation among providers are analyzed under benefit-dominated and stochastic factor-dominated situations. Through numerical simulation, the effects of the cloud platform’s cost-sharing coefficient for low-carbon investment, matching growth rate, carbon trading price, and group size on providers’ low-carbon strategy evolution are analyzed. The research results show that increasing the cloud platform’s low-carbon cost-sharing, carbon trading price, and group size can promote low-carbon cooperation among service providers. With greater low-carbon investment costs and greater stochastic factor interference, the providers’ enthusiasm for low-carbon cooperation decreases. This study fills the research gap in the low-carbon cooperation evolution of cloud manufacturing providers based on the stochastic evolutionary game and provides decision-making suggestions for governments and cloud platforms to encourage provider participation in low-carbon cooperation and for providers to adopt low-carbon strategies.

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An evolutionary analysis on the eﬀect of government policies on green R & D of photovoltaic industry diﬀusion in complex network

Cited by 42 publications

References 62 publications

Strategic corporate social responsibility with spillover effect in innovation

Strategic corporate social responsibility with spillover effect in innovation

How Do Government Policies Promote Green Housing Diffusion in China? A Complex Network Game Context

Evolution analysis of low-carbon cooperation of service providers based on Moran process in cloud manufacturing

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