An evolutionary dynamics model for metastatic tumour growth based on public goods games

In this study, we explore interactions between cancer cells by using the hawk–dove game. We analyze the heterogeneity of tumors by considering games with populations composed of 2 or 3 types of cell. We determine what strategies are evolutionarily stable in the 2-type and 3-type population games and what the corresponding expected payoffs are. Our results show that the payoff of the best-off cell in the 2-type population game is higher than that of the best-off cell in the 3-type population game. When these mathematical findings are transferred to the field of oncology they suggest that a tumor with low intratumor heterogeneity pursues a more aggressive course than one with high intratumor heterogeneity. Some histological and genomic data on clear cell renal cell carcinomas is consistent with these results. We underline the importance of identifying intratumor heterogeneity in routine practice and suggest that therapeutic strategies that preserve heterogeneity may be promising as they may slow down cancer growth.

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“… 2019 , 2020 ), coordination games (Bayer et al. 2022 ) and public good games (Nogales and Zazo 2021 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Heterogeneity on Cancer: A Game Theory Perspective

et al. 2023

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“…If the cooperative cancer cell also derives some benefit from its action then the game shifts from being a Prisoner's Dilemma to a public goods game [8]. By producing VEGF for recruiting vasculature or creating acidic conditions as immune-suppression, the focal cancer cell benefits itself while also benefiting neighbors [9,10]. Such games can promote a diversity of cancer cell types, where some become producers while others act as free-loaders, contributing nothing to the public good [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination games in cancer

et al. 2022

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We propose a model of cancer initiation and progression where tumor growth is modulated by an evolutionary coordination game. Evolutionary games of cancer are widely used to model frequency-dependent cell interactions with the most studied games being the Prisoner’s Dilemma and public goods games. Coordination games, by their more obscure and less evocative nature, are left understudied, despite the fact that, as we argue, they offer great potential in understanding and treating cancer. In this paper we present the conditions under which coordination games between cancer cells evolve, we propose aspects of cancer that can be modeled as results of coordination games, and explore the ways through which coordination games of cancer can be exploited for therapy.

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“…If the cooperative cancer cell also derives some benefit from its action then the game shifts from being a Prisoner's Dilemma to a public goods game (Archetti and Pienta, 2019). By producing VEGF for recruiting vasculature or creating acidic conditions as immune-suppression, the focal cancer cell benefits itself while also benefiting neighbors (Kimmel et al, 2019;Nogales and Zazo, 2021). Such games can promote a diversity of cancer cell types, where some become producers while others act as free-loaders, contributing nothing to the public good (Bayer et al, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination games in cancer

Bayer¹

2021

Preprint

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We propose a model of cancer initiation and progression where tumor growth is modulated by an evolutionary coordination game. Evolutionary games of cancer are widely used to model frequency-dependent cell interactions with the most studied games being the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Coordination games, by their more obscure and less evocative nature, are left understudied, despite the fact that, as we argue, they offer great potential in understanding and treating cancer. In this paper we present the conditions under which coordination games between cancer cells evolve, we propose aspects of cancer that can be modeled as results of coordination games, and explore the ways through which coordination games of cancer can be exploited for therapy.

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An evolutionary dynamics model for metastatic tumour growth based on public goods games

Cited by 5 publications

References 87 publications

Effects of Heterogeneity on Cancer: A Game Theory Perspective

Effects of Heterogeneity on Cancer: A Game Theory Perspective

Coordination games in cancer

Coordination games in cancer

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