An evolutionary game analysis of the prefabricated building supply side under dynamic government reward and punishment mechanisms

Abstract

From the standpoint of the supply side of prefabricated buildings, an evolutionary game model between the government and developers is constructed under the static and dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms in order to promote the development of prefabricated buildings and realize the transformation and upgrading of the construction industry. The simulation study of the example is conducted, and the impact of policy cost, subsidy upper limit, and tax upper limit on the system’s evolutionary stability strategy is examined. The findings demonstrate that when the government chooses static subsidy and static tax policies, there is no evolutionary stable strategy in the game system. The flaws of the static reward and punishment system can be adequately compensated for by the dynamic subsidy and dynamic tax policy, leading to an evolutionary stable state. The likelihood of developers producing prefabricated structures is negatively connected with policy cost and subsidy upper limits and favorably correlated with tax upper limits, according to the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism. The findings of the study have significant implications for government policy that will encourage the widespread use of prefabricated structures in China.