An examination of how the effort-inducing property of incentive compensation influences performance in multidimensional tasks

Harris, Ling L.; Majerczyk, Michael; Newman, Andrew H.

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.010

Cited by 15 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…The results relating to the rewards posted by the patients indicated that this variable is closely related to the intention of the doctors’ participation. Our results suggest that similar to other crowdsourcing fields [ 25 , 51 ], doctors are very concerned about the reward. The reward drives doctors to participate in services that help patients solve their health problems.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 78%

“…Previous studies have investigated the motivations behind the behavior of the participating users in posting their ideas on crowdsourcing websites [ 25 - 28 ]. These motivations can be divided into 2 dimensions: extrinsic motivations [ 25 - 27 ] and intrinsic motivations [ 28 - 30 ]. For the extrinsic motivations, researchers have shown that financial incentives such as monetary stimulus play an important role in the users’ participating behaviors [ 31 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the extrinsic motivations, researchers have shown that financial incentives such as monetary stimulus play an important role in the users’ participating behaviors [ 31 ]. Some studies have shown that the reward is the primary source of income on the crowdsourcing platforms and this reward drives users to participate in tasks [ 25 - 27 ]. For intrinsic motivations, some studies have proposed that the reasons for participation in crowdsourced tasks include factors such as competency, reputation, altruism, and learning, which are the critical driving forces of the participation behaviors [ 28 - 30 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Factors Influencing Doctors’ Participation in the Provision of Medical Services Through Crowdsourced Health Care Information Websites: Elaboration-Likelihood Perspective Study

Si¹,

Wu²,

Qing³

2020

JMIR Med Inform

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Background Web-based crowdsourcing promotes the goals achieved effectively by gaining solutions from public groups via the internet, and it has gained extensive attention in both business and academia. As a new mode of sourcing, crowdsourcing has been proven to improve efficiency, quality, and diversity of tasks. However, little attention has been given to crowdsourcing in the health sector. Objective Crowdsourced health care information websites enable patients to post their questions in the question pool, which is accessible to all doctors, and the patients wait for doctors to respond to their questions. Since the sustainable development of crowdsourced health care information websites depends on the participation of the doctors, we aimed to investigate the factors influencing doctors’ participation in providing health care information in these websites from the perspective of the elaboration-likelihood model. Methods We collected 1524 questions with complete patient-doctor interaction processes from an online health community in China to test all the hypotheses. We divided the doctors into 2 groups based on the sequence of the answers: (1) doctor who answered the patient’s question first and (2) the doctors who answered that question after the doctor who answered first. All analyses were conducted using the ordinary least squares method. Results First, the ability of the doctor who first answered the health-related question was found to positively influence the participation of the following doctors who answered after the first doctor responded to the question (βoffline1=.177, P<.001; βoffline2=.063, P=.048; βonline=.418, P<.001). Second, the reward that the patient offered for the best answer showed a positive effect on doctors’ participation (β=.019, P<.001). Third, the question’s complexity was found to positively moderate the relationships between the ability of the first doctor who answered and the participation of the following doctors (β=.186, P=.05) and to mitigate the effect between the reward and the participation of the following doctors (β=–.003, P=.10). Conclusions This study has both theoretical and practical contributions. Online health community managers can build effective incentive mechanisms to encourage highly competent doctors to participate in the provision of medical services in crowdsourced health care information websites and they can increase the reward incentives for each question to increase the participation of the doctors.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 78%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Factors Influencing Doctors’ Participation in the Provision of Medical Services Through Crowdsourced Health Care Information Websites: Elaboration-Likelihood Perspective Study

Si¹,

Wu²,

Qing³

2020

JMIR Med Inform

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…To get a positive cross‐derivative

U_{a b}

, however, one needs to overcome the assumed supermodularity (

c_{a b} goodbreakinfix> 0

) of the cost function, which makes the agent tend to decrease effort on one task after increasing it on the other task. Several solutions have been put forward in principal–agent settings (e.g., Al‐Ubaydli et al, ; Brüggen & Moers, ; Fehr & Schmidt, ; Harris et al, ; MacDonald & Marx, ; Sinclair‐Desgagné, ). But common agency bears the additional challenge to make competing principals coordinate in creating complementarity between tasks.…”

Section: Complementarity Incentives and The Mitigation Of Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The former emphasize the trade-off between profit maximization and other socially desirable objectives; we show here that there might be no need to sacrifice on either aim. The latter has brought up several ways to restore incentives, such as job design (Holmström & Milgrom, 1991), organizational form (Besanko, Régibeau, & Rockett, 2005), framing and communication (Harris, Majerczyk, & Newman, 2018), discretionary bonuses (Fehr & Schmidt, 2004), social incentives (Brüggen & Moers, 2007), relational contracts (Schöttner, 2007), budgeting (Gautier & Wauthy, 2007), and pay policy as a signal under asymmetric information about a principal's monitoring capability (Al-Ubaydli, Andersen, Gneezy, & List, 2015); we highlight here a combination of contingent monitoring (Fagart & Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007) and clawbacks (Babenko, Bennett, Bizjak, & Coles 2017;Hoffman, Inderst, & Opp, 2018, among others). 4 This diagnostic has been spelled out with greater precision and generality by Segal (1999).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Principles versus principal: Reconciling norm compliance and shareholder value

Sinclair‐Desgagné

2019

J Public Economic Theory

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This paper considers situations where an agent (say, a polluting firm's CEO) must allocate his nonobservable effort across two distinct tasks (say, revenue/market share enhancement and environmental stewardship), and where two principals (say, the firm's shareholders and an external stakeholder) hold diverging viewpoints on what the best allocation should be. Both characteristics of this context—multitasking and conflicting principals—are normally seen as obstacles to strengthening the agent's incentives. This paper proposes a simple arrangement, based on contingent monitoring and clawbacks, that can overcome these obstacles. Under this arrangement, the principals would end up coordinating their respective incentive schemes so that the agent considers his two tasks as complementary utility‐increasing activities. Applications to regulatory compliance, corporate social responsibility, and innovation management are briefly sketched.

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Does haste always make waste? Service quantity, service quality, and incentives in speed-intensive service firms

et al. 2018

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Research demonstrates a tradeoff between service quantity and service quality that creates a tension for firms who wish to incentivize both aspects of service performance. We propose a category of speed-intensive services in which prompt responsiveness is the primary driver of service quality. In these firms, service quantity and quality should exhibit a positive interrelationship. Daily data on service quantity and quality performance were collected for 24 months, for a total of 1414 observations, from a telephone directory service firm, an affiliate of major telecommunication firm in an Asian country. We use a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation to test their interrelationship and the effect of financial incentives on service performance. Contrary to the typical tradeoff effect, the results reveal that service quantity positively affects service quality performance and vice versa. In addition, we surprisingly find that incentives have no effect on service quantity performance and decrease service quality performance, and that overall performance declines with employee experience. This suggests that these firms do not face a tradeoff between service quantity and quality, but may face a long-term tradeoff between customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction.

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An examination of how the effort-inducing property of incentive compensation influences performance in multidimensional tasks

Cited by 15 publications

References 27 publications

Factors Influencing Doctors’ Participation in the Provision of Medical Services Through Crowdsourced Health Care Information Websites: Elaboration-Likelihood Perspective Study

Factors Influencing Doctors’ Participation in the Provision of Medical Services Through Crowdsourced Health Care Information Websites: Elaboration-Likelihood Perspective Study

Principles versus principal: Reconciling norm compliance and shareholder value

Does haste always make waste? Service quantity, service quality, and incentives in speed-intensive service firms

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