“An example for corporate social responsibility”: British American Tobacco's response to criticism of its Myanmar subsidiary, 1999–2003

Abstract

In 2013, British American Tobacco (BAT) returned to Myanmar a decade after it had left the country under pressure from civil society, international organizations, and the government of the United Kingdom. The company's involvement in a joint venture with an investment branch of the country's military government between 1999 and 2003 resulted in intense scrutiny and criticism based on the military's record of human rights abuses. BAT argued that corporations could not be held accountable for actions of governments in countries in which it operated, and that its presence in Myanmar contributed to economic and social development. It also maintained that its Myanmar subsidiary provided a model of responsible business conduct. The controversy that surrounded BAT's Myanmar subsidiary between 1999 and 2003 has increasing relevance to the current situation in Myanmar, and potential implications for foreign corporations operating in the country.

Supply chain accountability, COVID-19, and violations of workers’ rights in the global clothing supply chain

“…and 'lack of ability to prevent,' have been noted in the literature (Dan & Haddow, 2007;Mackenzie, 2018). These strategies are examined in the next section.…”

“…Secondly, retailers exploit regulatory loopholes and ambiguity to evade effective compliance (Monciardini et al , 2021) and use voluntary compliance as a vehicle for legitimacy (Li and Haque, 2019). Thirdly, denying responsibility is a common strategy used by retailers to defend their position (Dann and Haddow, 2007; Mackenzie, 2018). Dann and Haddow (2007, pp.…”

“…Previous studies have focused on how retailers respond to regulations to avoid responsibilities for maintaining the working conditions in their supply chains. Strategies such as transferring the responsibilities upon small suppliers (Lewthwaite‐Page, 1998; Knudsen, 2012), using loopholes and ambiguity to evade effective compliance with soft regulations (Monciardini et al , 2021), and deploying excuses such as “pragmatic calculation”, “ignorance” and “lack of ability to prevent”, have been noted in the literature (Dann and Haddow, 2007; Mackenzie, 2018). These strategies are examined in the next section.…”

A Systematic Review of Tobacco Industry Tactics in Southeast Asia: Lessons for Other Low- And MiddleIncome Regions

“…76,81,93 Boosting Corporate Image and Network Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives to Boost Image From 2010 to 2018, TTCs spent over $80 million on CSR initiatives in Southeast Asia, 2,103,104 much of which was spent on promoting these initiatives to boost corporate image. 105 These CSR initiatives were either funded directly or channelled through foundations or industry-related associations (Table 4), and usually focused on human rights, the environment, employee welfare, education, social welfare, poverty, disaster relief, or arts and culture. 2,42,68,71,74,77,88,89,93,99,[103][104][105][106][107][108][109][110][111] TTCs used these initiatives to gain publicity, 110 promote their products, 99,112 enhance their network and image with governments, 76,77,81,95,105,111,113 local organizations, 110 and international organizations (UNDP, ILO, UNICEF), 103,110,114 and to engage tobacco farmers in protobacco lobbying.…”

“…123 In Indonesia, PMI subsidiary Sampoerna ignored complaints of mistreatment, low pay, poor living conditions, and unsafe working environments from its factory workers. 116 Moreover, TTCs also profited from child labour in Southeast Asia, 103,105,110 while their CSR initiatives to combat child labour in the region had little impact. 103,114 Strategic Allies (Third Parties, Front Groups) TTCs funded or partnered with front groups and third parties in Southeast Asia to gain access to governments, undermine tobacco regulations and boost their corporate image ( Table 5).…”