An exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism

Abstract

The chief motivation for epiphenomenalist dualism is its promise to solve dualism's causal exclusion problem without inducing causal overdetermination or violations of the causal closure of the physical. This paper argues that epiphenomenalist dualism is itself susceptible to an exclusion problem. The problem exploits symmetries of determination and influence generated by a wide class of physical theories. Further, I argue that there is an interference effect between solving epiphenomenalist dualism's exclusion problem and using epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the causal exclusion problem. What emerges is an overlooked, empirically motivated challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism.

Harmony in a panpsychist world

“… 29 I myself think this constraint is empirically unwarranted and I have argued that standard appeals to the causal closure of the physical to motivate rivals to interactionist dualism are misguided for other reasons (Saad, 2018 , 2020b ). But I agree that those views are committed to respecting the causal closure of the physical.…”