An Experimental Economics Investigation of Shipper-carrier Interactions in the Choice of Mode and Shipment Size in Freight Transport

Holguín‐Veras, José; Xu, Ning; Jong, Gerard de; Maurer, Hedi

doi:10.1007/s11067-009-9107-x

Cited by 55 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In supplier-carrier interactions, the payoff structure is such that collaboration is the only alternative (Holguín-Veras, 2002). The incentive to collaborate is so strong that economic experiments concluded shippers and carriers could be replaced with a super-agent that optimizes the overall performance (Holguín-Veras et al, 2011b). In contrast, in carrier-receiver interactions the nature of the payoffs lead the agents to prefer opposite outcomes as part of the Battle of the Sexes game (Rasmusen, 2001;Holguín-Veras et al, 2007a).…”

Section: Freight Agent Interactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this case, the single most important variable is the shipment size (McFadden et al, 1986;Holguín-Veras, 2002;Holguín-Veras et al, 2011b) which is widely considered to be "…mode determining…" (Samuelson, 1977). Suppliers or receivers decide on the shipment size that will minimize their total logistic costs.…”

Section: Freight Agent Interactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In terms of delivery time, which also determines the carriers' response to time-of-day (TOD) pricing, the receiver is the one that typically decides (Holguín-Veras et al, 2007a). These decisions are continuously updated in response to market conditions and the experience in previous time periods (Holguín-Veras, 2002;Holguín-Veras et al, 2011b). Suppliers, for instance, may select a shipment size and then assess the performance of the carriers.…”

Section: Freight Agent Interactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Agent interactions and the response of supply chains to pricing and incentives

Holguín‐Veras

Aros‐Vera

Browne

2015

Economics of Transportation

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Section: Freight Agent Interactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Freight Agent Interactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Freight Agent Interactionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agent interactions and the response of supply chains to pricing and incentives

Holguín‐Veras

Aros‐Vera

Browne

2015

Economics of Transportation

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“…For TL transportation, most papers adopt a centralized planning approach in which profit/cost allocation among collaborative partners is a key issue. Ergun et al [9,10] studied shipper collaboration and formulated its centralized planning problem as a lane covering problem; Houghtalen et al [11] studied carrier collaboration and proposed a mechanism for allocating both resources and profits among carriers by appropriately setting prices for the resources. Kwon et al [15] and Lee et al [18] proposed a combinatorial auction mechanism for transportation procurement of a shipper from carriers.…”

Section: Collaboration In Transportationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A multi-agent and auction-based framework and approach for carrier collaboration

Dai

Chen

2011

Logist. Res.

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Carrier collaboration in transportation means multiple carriers form an alliance to optimize their transportation operations through sharing transportation requests and vehicle capacities. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent and auction-based framework and approach for carrier collaboration in less than truckload transportation. In this framework, the carriers outsource/acquire requests through multiple auctions, one for outsourcing each request; a carrier acts as an auctioneer when it wants to outsource a request to other carriers, whereas the carrier acts as a bidder when it wants to acquire a request from other carriers; for each carrier, which requests it should outsource and acquire are determined by solving its outsourcing requests selection problem and requests bidding problem, respectively. These two decision problems are formulated as mixed integer programming problems. The auction of each request is multiround; in each round, the auctioneer determines the outsourcing price of the request and each bidder determines whether it acquires the request at the given price; the auctioneer lowers the outsourcing price if multiple carriers bid for the request or raises the price if no carrier bids for it. The auction process continues until only one carrier bids for the request or a given number of rounds are achieved. In the second case, if no agent bids for the request, then it is returned to the outsourcing agent; if multiple bidding agents compete for the request, a conflict resolution procedure is used to determine which carrier wins it. The approach is decentralized, asynchronous, and dynamic, where multiple auctions may occur simultaneously and interact with each other. The performance of the approach is evaluated by randomly generated instances and compared with an individual planning approach and a centralized planning approach.

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“…However, the order of these decisions may be reversed and, for instance, be based on the available vehicle types and their operating costs that might affect the shipment size. The problem is not trivial, as there is no clear causality and/or sequence between these decisions, and there is no clear-cut explanation about which one is conditional on or a result of the other (McFadden et al, 1986;Inaba and Wallace, 1989;Abdelwahab and Sargious, 1991;Holguin-Veras, 2002;De Jong and Johnson, 2009;Holguín-Veras et al, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contributions to behavioural freight transport modelling

Irannezhad¹

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The empirical applications of behavioural freight transport models accounting for several dimensions of decision-making process strengthen our understanding of the impacts of various freight-related policies. Several developments have been made in recent years to model the choices of freight transport actors. In line with these developments, the goal of this research is to apply a set of models which gain insight into the behavioural underpinnings that affect decision-making in freight sectors. However, it should be noted that the complex and heterogeneous nature of freight decision making is an imperative impediment to developing a behavioural model that can represent all dimensions of decision making.While this study acknowledges that there are several choice decisions in the freight transportation system, this PhD study focuses on the most important ones including the choices of shipment size, using transshipment points and duration of storage, choosing the mode/vehicle of transport. Accordingly, this research is an effort to apply some empirical tools and approaches including advanced choice models and agent-based simulation in order to yield further gains in understanding of these particular decisions.Within decision making process of freight transport, there are multiple interrelated constructs that can be tackled from various angles. This research attempts to apply advance choice techniques to model a few of these interrelated decisions in freight transport. To achieve this target, contributions are given to several components of two sets of interrelated decisions by (i) modelling the joint decisions of shipment size and vehicle type using a copula-based continuous-discrete choice model; (ii) modelling the joint decisions of using a container terminal and the resulting dwell-time of staging full containers using a copulabased discrete-discrete choice model.Considering the differences in decision-making between for-hire carriers and ancillary shippers, separate different models are estimated while the assumption of pure utility maximization is relaxed via a hybrid utility-regret specification. Results of a case study show that differences exist between shippers' and carriers' preferences, and they prove the Publications during candidature Refereed Journal Papers 1. Nassir, Neema, Hickman, Mark, Malekzadeh, Ali, and Irannezhad, Elnaz

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An Experimental Economics Investigation of Shipper-carrier Interactions in the Choice of Mode and Shipment Size in Freight Transport

Abstract: Experimental economics, Freight mode choice, Shipper-carrier interactions, Game theory,

Cited by 55 publications

References 18 publications

Agent interactions and the response of supply chains to pricing and incentives

Agent interactions and the response of supply chains to pricing and incentives

A multi-agent and auction-based framework and approach for carrier collaboration

Contributions to behavioural freight transport modelling

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