An experimental study of brand signal quality of products in an asymmetric information environment

Tsao, Hsiu‐Yuan; Pitt, Leyland; Berthon, Pierre

doi:10.1016/j.omega.2005.01.001

Cited by 22 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Keller, 1993;Swait, Erdem, Louviere, & Dubelaar, 1993). Tsao (2002) suggests two means of measuring brand equity: the first is derived from cognitive psychology, the second, from information economics. Cognitive psychology suggests that buyerbased brand equity is a consequence of the performance and personality of the brand, and is reflected in the perceptions of buyers (Tsao, 2002).…”

Section: Brand Equity and Signallingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Tsao (2002) suggests two means of measuring brand equity: the first is derived from cognitive psychology, the second, from information economics. Cognitive psychology suggests that buyerbased brand equity is a consequence of the performance and personality of the brand, and is reflected in the perceptions of buyers (Tsao, 2002). Keller (1993, p. 1) states that 'Customer-based brand equity is defined as the differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response to the marketing of the brand'.…”

Section: Brand Equity and Signallingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Employer branding: strategic implications for staff recruitment

Wilden

Gudergan

Lings

2010

Journal of Marketing Management

299

203

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Section: Brand Equity and Signallingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Brand Equity and Signallingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Employer branding: strategic implications for staff recruitment

Wilden

Gudergan

Lings

2010

Journal of Marketing Management

299

203

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“…Eriksson and Simpson (2007) used the apparatus of the auctions with asymmetric information for the behavioural research -they investigated whether honesty plays some role in the decision making. Tsao et al (2006Tsao et al ( , 2009) concentrated on the signalling as well, using the real brands as signals. Wilson and Zillante (2010) studied the outcomes of the "lemons" market under different information conditions and auction mechanisms.…”

Section: Experimental Policy Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Measures ensuring the food quality on retail markets: experimental perspective

Polivka¹,

Martinčík²

2014

AGR ECON-CZECH

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Due to the ongoing problems with the quality of foods in European markets, the public authorities try to take some measures, which would reduce the amount of substandard food products off ered to consumers in retailing. Th ree such measures -the higher frequency of quality checks conducted by public authorities, the imposition of some import barriers on the foodstuff s from countries known for their frequent breaches of quality standards in the food industry and the establishment of an information platform serving for the public pillorying of poor quality food -are studied in this paper. Th e experimental policy analysis was used as the research method. Th e results obtained show that only the higher frequency of quality checks can improve the situation of consumers. Th is measure is also eff ective in punishing the dishonest retailers, while not harming the honest ones.

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“…Thus, if signaling via a brand name is effective, mimetic pricing behavior on the part of an opportunistic competitor is mitigated (Tsao et al 2006). As a result, stronger brands may enjoy a price premium over weaker brands, and branded products may realize higher prices over unbranded products (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001).…”

Section: Reduce Price Comparisons and Guarantee Price Premiumsmentioning

confidence: 99%

E-commerce: a brand name’s curse

Otim

Grover

2010

Electron Markets

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The reach of the Internet and the low cost of selling products online have made it possible for anybody to participate in the online market. In this paper, we argue that e-commerce can be a brand name's curse due to information asymmetries and the existence of indifferent consumers, which perpetuate counterfeiting of branded products and the infringement of brand names in emarkets. Counterfeiting and infringement devalue the information capital embodied in a brand name, and ultimately reduce sales and profits of the brand name holders. While legal measures have been enacted to deal with intellectual property problems, we argue that market mechanisms are more efficient and more effective in dealing with brand name problems in e-markets. This is because rules in themselves often provide neither the slightest hint of where to look for violations, nor the incentive to convict violators. Market mechanisms such as information syndication, pricing of e-markets services, and vendor malpractice could be effective in deterring counterfeiting and brand name infringement. We hope our positional contribution will stir interest to look into this serious problem and extend our suggestions by developing concrete innovative mechanisms to safeguard online transactions.

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An experimental study of brand signal quality of products in an asymmetric information environment

Cited by 22 publications

References 16 publications

Employer branding: strategic implications for staff recruitment

Employer branding: strategic implications for staff recruitment

Measures ensuring the food quality on retail markets: experimental perspective

E-commerce: a brand name’s curse

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