An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

Anderhub, Vital; Engelmann, Dirk; Güth, Werner

doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00216-5

Cited by 128 publications

(82 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…In a related market environment, Bohnet et al (2005) demonstrate that providing feedback, which allows players to observe their partner's history, improves the functioning of the market since participants are found to learn the mechanics of reputation building by imitation. Anderhub et al (2002) use computers to induce the probability of facing a second mover who always reciprocate in a trust game. They conclude that reputation formation provides a reasonable account of their data.…”

Section: Related Experimental Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Roth and Schoumaker (1983) subjects also bargain with computers, but they are not aware of it. Other experiments involving computer players, but in different strategic settings, include Andreoni and Miller (1993), Anderhub et al (2002) and Grosskopf and Sarin (2010), among others. 9 In this model, such comparative static predictions depend on the specific distribution of behavioral types.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bargaining and Reputation: An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioural Types

Embrey

Fréchette

Lehrer

2014

The Review of Economic Studies

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Article (Accepted Version) http://sro.sussex.ac.uk Embrey, Matthew, Fréchette, Guillaume R and Lehrer, Steven F (2015) Bargaining and reputation: an experiment on bargaining in the presence of behavioural types. Review of Economic Studies, 82 (2). pp. This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/57995/ This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published version. Copyright and reuse:Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available.Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. AbstractWe conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their demands, creates incentives for all players to build reputations for being hard bargainers. The data are qualitatively consistent with the * We wish to thank Jim Andreoni, Colin Camerer, John Kagel, Muriel Niederle, Tom Palfrey, Ennio Stacchetti, Leeat Yariv and three anonymous referees, as well as seminar participants at Caltech, Maastricht University, New York University, Royal Holloway, Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona, Università Bocconi, University of Michigan and University of Texas-Austin, and the ESA Asia-Pacific meetings, ESA North American meetings, the FSU Workshop on Experimental Game Theory, the Stony Brook Game Theory Festival, and the SITE Conference on Experimental Economics for helpful comments and suggestions that improved the paper. We thank Raj Advani, Samuel Mati and Anwar Ruff for software development, and Jacopo Perego, Tobias Salz, Chloé Tergiman, Séverine Toussaert and Sevgi Yuksel for research assistance. Fréchette and Lehrer respectively wish to thank the NSF (grants SES-0519045, SES-0721111, SES-0924780, and SES-1225779), CV Starr Center, Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS) and SSHRC for research support. We are responsible for all errors. 1 theory, as subjects mimic induced types. Furthermore, we find evidence for the presence of complementary types, whose initial demands acquiesce to in...

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Section: Related Experimental Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining and Reputation: An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioural Types

Embrey

Fréchette

Lehrer

2014

The Review of Economic Studies

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“…With full information, sellers can build much stronger reputations vis-à-vis all potential customers. However, somewhat 1 Similar games have previously been used to investigate issues of trust by GÜTH, OCKENFELS, and WENDEL (1997), BOHNET, FREY and HUCK (2001), ANDERHUB, ENGELMANN, and GÜTH (2002), BOLTON, KATOK, and OCKENFELS (2004), BOHNET and HUCK (2004), and BOHNET, HARMGART, HUCK, and TYRAN (2005). The binary structure of the game lends itself to a much simpler interpretation than the continuous "investment game" popularized by BERG, DICKHAUT, and MCCABE (1995).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition fosters trust

Huck

Lünser

Tyran

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

123

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We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency quadruples but is still at only a third of the first best. Adding more information by granting buyers access to all sellers' complete history has, somewhat surprisingly, no effect. On the other hand, we find that competition, coupled with some minimal information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely.

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“…the game ends after one round of money exchange, or repeated, i.e. it lasts several rounds [4], [5], [6]. The pairs of users could be fixed [7] or re-assigned before each round [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Computational Trust Model for Repeated Trust Games

Dang

Ignat²

2016

2016 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/Ispa

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To cite this version:Abstract-Trust game is a money exchange game that has been widely used in behavioral economics for studying trust and collaboration between humans. In this game, exchange of money is entirely attributable to the existence of trust between users. The trust game could be one-shot, i.e. the game ends after one round of money exchange, or repeated, i.e. it lasts several rounds. Predicting user behavior in the repeated trust game is of critical importance for the next movement of the partners. However, existing behavior prediction approaches uniquely rely on players personal information such as their age, gender and income and do not consider their past behavior in the game.In this paper, we propose a computational trust metric that is uniquely based on users past behavior and can predict the future behavior in repeated trust game. Our trust metric can distinguish between users having different behavioral profiles and is resistant to fluctuating user behavior. We validate our model by using an empirical approach against data sets collected from several trust game experiments. We show that our model is consistent with rating opinions of users, and our model can provide higher accuracy on predicting users' behavior compared with other naive models.

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An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

Cited by 128 publications

References 11 publications

Bargaining and Reputation: An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioural Types

Bargaining and Reputation: An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioural Types

Competition fosters trust

Computational Trust Model for Repeated Trust Games

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