An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism

Hugh-Jones, David; Kurino, Morimitsu; Vanberg, Christoph

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.001

Cited by 12 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A recent experimental study on the incentive properties of PS shows that human subjects are less likely to manipulate the mechanism when misreporting is a Nash equilibrium. However, subjects' tendency for misreporting is still significant even when it does not improve their allocations[16]. Hence, the PS mechanism suffers from incentive properties.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Random Serial Dictatorship versus Probabilistic Serial Rule: A Tale of Two Random Mechanisms

Hosseini,

Larson,

Cohen

2015

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For assignment problems where agents, specifying ordinal preferences, are allocated indivisible objects, two widely studied randomized mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). These two mechanisms both have desirable economic and computational properties, but the outcomes they induce can be incomparable in many instances, thus creating challenges in deciding which mechanism to adopt in practice. In this paper we first look at the space of lexicographic preferences and show that, as opposed to the general preference domain, RSD satisfies envyfreeness. Moreover, we show that although under lexicographic preferences PS is strategyproof when the number of objects is less than or equal agents, it is strictly manipulable when there are more objects than agents. In the space of general preferences, we provide empirical results on the (in)comparability of RSD and PS, analyze economic properties, and provide further insights on the applicability of each mechanism in different application domains.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Random Serial Dictatorship versus Probabilistic Serial Rule: A Tale of Two Random Mechanisms

Hosseini,

Larson,

Cohen

2015

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism

Ekici

Kesten

2015

Int J Game Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.The prominent mechanism of the recent literature in the assignment problem is the probabilistic serial (PS). Under PS, the truthful (preference) proÖle always constitutes an ordinal Nash Equilibrium, inducing a random assignment that satisÖes the appealing ordinal e¢ ciency and envy-freeness properties. We show that both properties may fail to be satisÖed by a random assignment induced in an ordinal Nash Equilibrium where one or more agents are non-truthful. Worse still, the truthful proÖle may not constitute a Nash Equilibrium, and every non-truthful proÖle that constitutes a Nash Equilibrium may lead to a random assignment which is not ordinally e¢ cient, not even weakly envy-free, and which admits an ex-post ine¢ cient decomposition. A strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium may not exist, but when it exists, any proÖle that constitutes a strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium induces the random assignment induced under the truthful proÖle. The results of our equilibrium analysis of PS call for caution when implementing it in small assignment problems

show abstract

Efficient lottery design

2016

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Onur Kesten Carnegie Mellon University Morimitsu Kurino University of Tsukuba Alexander Nesterov WZB Copyright remains with the author(s).Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole. There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely-used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.

show abstract

An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism

Cited by 12 publications

References 23 publications

Random Serial Dictatorship versus Probabilistic Serial Rule: A Tale of Two Random Mechanisms

Random Serial Dictatorship versus Probabilistic Serial Rule: A Tale of Two Random Mechanisms

An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism

Efficient lottery design

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About