“…The majority of security-related economics analysis of human behavior has focused on experts' (e.g., system or network administrators) responses to threat [Christin et al, 2004, Grossklags et al, 2008b, Hota and Sundaram, 2015, Johnson et al, 2010, organizational responses to threat [Campbell et al, 2003, Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005, Miura-Ko et al, 2008, or attackers [Alpcan and Basar, 2006, Chen and Leneutre, 2009, Liu et al, 2006, Manshaei et al, 2013, Sallhammar et al, 2005, Shim et al, 2012. For example, Grossklags and colleagues conduct a number of different studies applying game-theoretic models to examine expert behavior in attack/defense security games [Christin et al, 2004, Grossklags et al, 2008a,b, Johnson et al, 2010 finding evidence of unclear risks and bounded rationality for security professionals; and relatedly, Rounds et al examined the impact of changes in security and reward on attacker responses, finding that as the value of an account increases, so too does the number of attacks on that account; and as the amount of security on an account increases so too does the number of attacks decrease [Rounds et al, 2013]. These analyses of experts, however, provide limited insight into end-user behavior.…”