An Exploration of Collaboration Risk in Joint Ventures: Perceptions of Risk by Local Economic Development Officials

Abstract

This study explores the nature of “collaboration” risk in joint ventures and the factors that affect local development officials’ perceptions of these risks. Extant research on barriers to joint venture formation clearly indicates an important role for collaboration risk, but a systematic examination of the factors shaping local officials’ perceptions of this risk is lacking. The authors propose that their perceptions of the region’s norms regarding interlocal collaboration, the structure of the communication networks they have created with other local officials, and differences in the racial composition of their own cities are important factors shaping their perceptions of collaboration risk. The findings provide researchers with a basis for understanding the dimensions of collaboration risk in joint ventures and highlight the importance of the regional climate of cooperation among municipal leaders in shaping these perceptions. The two measures capturing the environment for collaboration in the region had the strongest link to the respondents’ perception of collaboration risk on joint ventures for economic development.

Testing structural and relational embeddedness in collaboration risk

“…A survey questionnaire was utilized to measure respondents’ perceived collaboration risk, captured in three dimensions: coordination, division, and defection risk (Feiock, 2013). Despite vigorous investigation of the unfolding theoretical consideration of collaboration risk embedded in collaborative management, empirical testing has only recently begun (Carr et al, 2017; Deslatte et al, 2017; Song et al, 2018). We specifically designed the statements in the survey to operationalize the specific dimensions of the concept of collaboration risk.…”

Intermunicipal Cooperation in Metropolitan Regions in Brazil and Mexico: Does Federalism Matter?

“…But metropolitan regions are ill-equipped to address flows of people, money, and issues that transcend the municipal boundaries (Ramirez De la Cruz 2012;Matkin and Frederickson 2009). Many studies have addressed IMC (Andrew 2009;Feiock 2007;Hawkins, Hu, and Feiock 2016;Pacheco-Vega 2014); however, the need for cooperation in MRs is vital (Feiock and Scholz 2009;Lidström 2017) because of their interdependencies (Carr, Hawkins, and Westberg 2017). IMC is also less well studied in MRs (Hawkins 2010).…”

“…For instance, large socioeconomic differences hinder the establishment of IMC because its benefits will appear less appealing to a wealthier community (Carr, Hawkins, and Westberg 2017;Tavares and Feiock 2018). Propensity to cooperate increases if the interests of a local government are addressed, while decreasing with higher costs or partners with lower financial capabilities (Bel and Warner 2016;Carr, Gerber, and Lupher 2007;Hawkins 2009Hawkins , 2010Lowery 2000;Lubell, Schneider, Scholtz, and Mete 2002).…”

“…Since electoral and political processes are independent within metropolitan municipalities, party tenure and party fragmentation can limit the incidence of IMC. Metropolitan political fragmentation negatively affects these agreements (Andrew and Hawkins 2013;Carr, Hawkins, and Westberg 2017;Carr, LeRoux, and Shrestha 2009;Feiock 2007;Hawkins 2010). In the absence of institutions safeguarding intertemporal cooperative arrangements, even party alternation increases transaction costs, reducing the levels of mutual trust, credibility, and reputation (Carr, LeRoux, and Shrestha 2009;Feiock 2009, p. 367).…”

Public Service-Function Types and Interlocal Agreement Network Structure: A Longitudinal Study of Iowa

“…Variables that are unrelated to the type of service being offered but may nonetheless influence network formation and structure also need to be explored. Factors that have already received some scholarly interest include broad contextual factors of a given region (Julnes and Pindur 1994), political and organizational culture (Visser 2002), perceived risk (Carr, Hawkins, and Westberg 2017), and party-imposed, governor-brokered, or interest-based coalitions (Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom 2005).…”