An extended ECC‐based anonymity‐preserving 3‐factor remote authentication scheme usable in TMIS

Abstract

A telecare medicine information system (TMIS) helps in providing an efficient communication platform to patients from home to consult doctors at a clinical center. In TMIS, the patient's confidentiality, security, and mutual authentication are very crucial; so remote authentication plays a vital role for verifying the legitimacy of patients. Recently, Amin and Biswas have devised a remote authentication protocol for TMIS, claiming it to be secured from various malicious vulnerabilities. We examine this protocol and find that it is not able to withstand many attacks that include off-line and online password-guessing, identity-guessing, user impersonation, privileged insider, and known session key temporary information attacks. We propose a 3-factor-based authentication protocol for TMIS by overcoming these security shortcomings. We present its security verification in formal and informal ways, which assert its resistivity against various security threats. We use the Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic for validating it, and with the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications tool, it is simulated. Further, the performance evaluation and the security functionalities justify high degree of security with efficient complexity.

Secure-user sign-in authentication for IoT-based eHealth systems

“…Also, the algorithms such 1024-bit Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm, 320-bits elliptic-curve (EC) cryptosystem, 128-bit advanced-encryption standard (AES), and 160 -bit secure-hash algorithm 1 (SHA-1) were employed to experiment the given assumption time that is as follows: ET H ≈ 0.0004 ms, ET SED ≈ 0.1303 ms, ET DM ≈ 1.8269 ms and ET ME ≈ 1.6003 ms in the given order [8]. From Table 3, the estimated execution time of the proposed S-USI scheme and other related schemes such as Nikooghadam et al [64], Chaudhry et al [65], Arshad et al [66], Lu et al [67], Amin and Biswas [69], and Chandrakar et al [75] were carefully examined to determine the execution time. The result of the proposed S-USI was 0.0689 ms, whereas the other related schemes were 0.0649 s, 0.5832 s, 0.3869 s, 0.2593 s, 0.3474 s, and 0.7689 s respectively.…”

“…Assume that length of the identity of U sr U id and password P wd , random-integer and hash-function are set to 160 bits, whereas the elliptic-curve considers 320 bits and the symmetric key encryption/decryption carries a size of 512 bits [75]. In the S-USI scheme, three message rounds are considered such as M sg1 = ⟨P 1 , P 2 , TS 1 ⟩ , M sg2 = ⟨Q 1 , Q 2 , TS 2 ⟩ and ⟨R, H⟩ to transmit between U ser and R S .…”

“…While comparing the computation costs of various system phases, it is observed that the proposed S-USI scheme consumes 3ET H + 2ET ME for registration and 8ET H + 1ET ME + 1ET SED for login and authentication, whereas Nikooghadam et al [64] have 2ET H + 1ET SED for registration and 6ET H + 6ET SED for login and authentication; Chaudhry et al [65] acquire 4ET H + 2ET SED + 1ET DM for registration and 14ET H + 6ET SED + 7ET DM for login and authentication; Arshad et al [66] hold 3ET H for registration and 14ET H + 6ET DM for login and authentication; Lu et al [67] possess 3ET H for registration and 11ET H + 4ET DM for login and authentication; Amin and Biswas [69] experience 3ET H + 1ET DM for registration and 9ET H + 5ET DM + 2ET SED for login and authentication; Chandrakar et al [75] have 6ET H + 4ET DM for registration and 18ET H + 8ET DM for login and authentication. The above analysis proves that the proposed S-USI scheme uses less computation cost over the execution of registration, login, and authentication phases as compared to other existing schemes [64-67, 69, 75] except Nikooghadam et al [64].…”

A secure and efficient remote patient‐monitoring authentication protocol for cloud‐IoT

“… ROM‐based verification proof This formal security analysis verifies that an adversary may not be able to retrieve crucial secret parameters such as ID i , PW i , V 1 , and session key SK. We adopted the similar procedure to for this analysis as given in previous studies 23,36,37 . The random oracle is defined as follows:…”

“…Still, the chebyshev chaotic maps are costly than symmetric hash‐based operations while the later has more compatibility for being inducted in the sensors ecosystem. Chandraker and Om 36 put forward another authentication scheme for TMIS‐based patient health care; however, it was vulnerable to offline‐password guessing and impersonation attack. Sharif et al 37 demonstrated an improved authentication scheme for WBAN; however, it is prone to session‐specific temporary information attack as well as key‐compromise impersonation attack.…”