An Historical Causal-Chain Theory of Conceptions of Intelligence

Abstract

Lurking behind every conception of intelligence—whether an implicit (folk) or explicit (expert-generated) conception—is an underlying theory of meaning that specifies the form the theory of intelligence does and, indeed, can take. These underlying theories of meaning become presuppositions for the conception’s form. The theories of meaning have different origins—for example, psycholinguistic, philosophical, and anthropological. This essay reviews the different underlying theories of meaning and proposes a new historical causal-chain theory of conceptions of intelligence. The underlying theories of meaning affect the flexibility and modifiability of laypersons’ (implicit) and experts’ (explicit) conceptions of intelligence. As a result, these historical causal chains have profound but largely invisible effects on societies.

Beyond Newton: Why assumptions of universality are critical to cognitive science, and how to finally move past them.

“…This opening line of a major review of work on intelligence could hardly be a better illustration of an unmarked universal: Intelligence, whatever it may be, is presupposed to generally determine the “cleverness” of individuals, omitting all context in true Newtonian fashion. Of course, this Newtonian approach to intelligence has for many decades been disputed by researchers who argue for intelligence as variable and culturally bound (e.g., Ceci, 1991, 1996; Greenfield, 2020; Sternberg, 2019; Sternberg et al, 2023; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2004; Tomasello, 2019).…”