An Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Resilient to Continuous Key Leakage

Wu, Jui-Di; Tseng, Yuh‐Min; Huang, Sen–Shan

doi:10.1109/jsyst.2019.2896132

Cited by 22 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Recently, in the BLReCK model, Ruan et al [45] presented a secure LR-IDAKE protocol and the total leaked bit size of private keys is limited. In 2019, Wu et al [46] further presented a secure LR-IDAKE protocol in the CLReCK model that permits adversaries to continually fetch fractional content of private keys and possesses overall unbounded leakage property.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the following, based on the CLReCK model in [42], [46], we define the associated CLReCK model of LR-CLAKE protocols to model the abilities of adversaries under the CL-PKC settings. As mentioned earlier, in a CL-PKC setting, the KGC has the long-term system secret key SSK.…”

Section: Security Notions (Adversary Model) Of Lr-clake Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, A2 is allowed to continually fetch fractional content of the user's self-chosen secret key pair (SKa, XKa) in the Session key establishment phase. In the following, we define a security game GCLReCK under the CL-PKC settings to model adversaries' capabilities in the CLReCK model [42], [46]. In the security game GCLReCK, an adversary A (A1 or A2) can request some queries to a challenger B who is responsible to respond to these queries.…”

Section: Security Notions (Adversary Model) Of Lr-clake Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Leakage-Resilient Certificateless Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Withstanding Side-Channel Attacks

2020

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Certificateless public-key cryptography has conquered both the certificate management problem in the traditional public-key cryptography and the key escrow problem in the ID-based public-key cryptography. Certificateless authenticated key exchange (CLAKE) protocol is an important primitive of the certificateless public-key cryptography. A CLAKE protocol is employed to provide both mutual authentication and establishing a session key between two participators. Indeed, all conventional public-key cryptographies have encountered a new kind of attack, named "side-channel attacks". Fortunately, leakageresilient cryptography is a flexible approach to withstand such attacks. However, the design of leakageresilient CLAKE (LR-CLAKE) protocols is not studied. In the article, by extending the well-known extended-Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, we present the security notions (adversary model) of LR-CLAKE protocols, called continual-leakage-resilient eCK (CLReCK) model. The first LR-CLAKE protocol withstanding side-channel attacks is proposed. By employing the proof technique of the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we formally prove the security of our protocol in the CLReCK model.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Security Notions (Adversary Model) Of Lr-clake Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Security Notions (Adversary Model) Of Lr-clake Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Leakage-Resilient Certificateless Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Withstanding Side-Channel Attacks

2020

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“…J. Wu et al [10] suggest a new session-based protocol named ID-CL-eCK that is an identity-based authenticated key exchange and this is the advancement of LR-ID-AKE. The leakage resilient based researches are carried out by [11 -14] and the proposed protocol is the advancement of that research.…”

Section: Fig 1 Overview Of Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Prototype Model of Virtual Authenticated Key Exchange Mechanism over Secured Channel in Ad-Hoc Environment

Malathi*,

Mohan.,

Arun.

et al. 2020

IJRTE

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Key exchange protocols play a vital role in symmetric key cryptography. The transfer of private key through the secured medium is a challenging task because every day the intruders are evolved and the attacks are increasing constantly. The existing key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman, Elgamal, and MQV, etc. are the old methods and many attacks happened on those protocols. That challenges demanding new protocol or methodology of transferring secret key between the parties. The paper proposes a new, secured, less computational overhead key exchange mechanism using short message service available in the cellular networks. GSM-SMS is a highly established secured channel and the research uses this facility to transfer the key between senders to a receiver of the symmetric key cryptosystem. The private key no need to reveal to third parties or even the receiver because the sender can directly communicate to the decryption system through the mobile SMS. After the decryption process, the secret key will be destroyed immediately. There is no possible attack during the key transfer and loss and error of the communication are very less.

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“…In the bounded leakage model [21], [23], the total amount of leakage information during the life time of the cryptographic scheme have to be bounded to a fixed ratio or bit-length. On the other hand, in the continuous leakage model [22], [26], [27], [28], adversaries are permitted to continuously gain partial information of these secret values for each invocation of the cryptographic scheme while the whole leakage amount is unbounded during the life time of the cryptographic scheme. Obviously, the continuous leakage model has less restrictions and possesses overall unbounded leakage property.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leakage-Resilient Certificate-based Key Encapsulation Scheme Resistant to Continual Leakage

Tseng

Huang

et al. 2020

IEEE Open J. Comput. Soc.

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In the past, the security of most public-key encryption or key encapsulation schemes is shown in an ideal model, where private keys, secret keys and random values are assumed to be absolutely secure to adversaries. However, this ideal model is not practical due to side-channel attacks in the sense that adversaries could gain partial information of these secret values involved in decryption operations by perceiving energy consumption or execution timing. In such a case, these schemes under the ideal model could suffer from side-channel attacks. Recently, leakage-resilient cryptography resistant to side-channel attacks is an emerging research topic. Certificatebased encryption (CBE) or certificate-based key encapsulation (CB-KE) schemes are a class of important public-key encryption. However, little work addresses the design of leakageresilient CBE (LR-CBE) or leakage-resilient CB-KE (LR-CB-KE) schemes. In this paper, we present the first LR-CB-KE scheme with overall unbounded leakage property which permits adversaries to continuously gain partial information of the system secret key of a trusted certificate authority (CA), the private keys and certificates of users, and random values. In the generic bilinear group model, formal security analysis is made to prove that the proposed LR-CB-KE scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks.

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An Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Resilient to Continuous Key Leakage

Cited by 22 publications

References 34 publications

A Leakage-Resilient Certificateless Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Withstanding Side-Channel Attacks

A Leakage-Resilient Certificateless Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Withstanding Side-Channel Attacks

A Prototype Model of Virtual Authenticated Key Exchange Mechanism over Secured Channel in Ad-Hoc Environment

Leakage-Resilient Certificate-based Key Encapsulation Scheme Resistant to Continual Leakage

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