2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.compeleceng.2011.09.015
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

An improved timestamp-based remote user authentication scheme

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
4
1

Citation Types

0
51
0

Year Published

2012
2012
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
4
4

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 35 publications
(51 citation statements)
references
References 8 publications
0
51
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Attackers can extract the data from smart card by monitoring the power consumption or analyzing the leaked information. Furthermore, on account of these defects of smart card, various attacks may be launched to break down the security of authentication schemes [1,14,19]. Recently, Czeskis et al [5] presented PhoneAuth, which takes advantage of conventional two-factor authentication and enjoys usability of typical password.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Attackers can extract the data from smart card by monitoring the power consumption or analyzing the leaked information. Furthermore, on account of these defects of smart card, various attacks may be launched to break down the security of authentication schemes [1,14,19]. Recently, Czeskis et al [5] presented PhoneAuth, which takes advantage of conventional two-factor authentication and enjoys usability of typical password.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, Liu et al [4], Awasthi et al [5] point out that Shen's scheme is still vulnerable to forged login attack. To surmount this shortcoming, Liu et al [4] proposed a new improved scheme based on nonce.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To surmount this shortcoming, Liu et al [4] proposed a new improved scheme based on nonce. Also, Awasthi et al [5] proposed an improved remote authentication scheme which still keeps the feature of the non-storage of data at server side.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, Wang et al's scheme is not easily repairable and is unable to provide perfect forward secrecy of the generated session key. Other instances of vulnerabilities in published smartcard-based password authentication schemes include off-line password guessing attack [6][7][8]22], impersonation attack [9][10][11], forgery attack [4,[12][13][14], DoS attack [4,7,18,23], parallel session attack [4,9,10,18], replay attack [23], stolen/lost smartcard attack [9,22,24], observing power consumption [25] and reverse engineering techniques [26,27].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ability to provide security guarantees is of paramount importance and several initiatives have been proposed to address this concern. Due to the low computation cost and portability of smartcard and easy memorization of user chosen password, two-factor smartcard authentication [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21] using password is commonly used in Internet-based applications such as remote user/server login, online banking, Pay-TV, electronic voting, secret online order placement.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%