“An Informal and Limited Alliance”: The President and the Supreme Court

Curry, Brett W.; Pacelle, Richard L.; Marshall, Bryan W.

doi:10.1111/j.1741-5705.2008.02637.x

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Having neither the purse nor the sword, we know the Court is cognizant of its public standing. Our results demonstrate how presidents can impact public opinion of Court outputs; the impact on opinion can be used to sanction or protect the Court (Curry, Pacelle, and Marshall ). Overall, this work offers contributions to the judicial–executive literature, as well as behavioral literature, offering a first experimental study about Court‐oriented presidential statements' impact on opinion.…”

mentioning

confidence: 75%

“…The Supreme Court must maintain sufficient levels of public approval to maintain institutional legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence ). The importance of institutional legitimacy, and the Court's concern with its legitimacy, is extensively covered in the judicial politics literature (Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth ; Clark ; Curry, Pacelle, and Marshall ; Rogol, Montgomery, and Kingsland ). Because the Court cares about its legitimacy, this may be an angle at which the president may attempt to influence the Court.…”

Section: Theory and Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also test whether the president's statements can influence attitudes on policy restrictions of the Court's decision. One of the president's means of influencing the Court is by responding to its policy outputs (Curry, Pacelle, and Marshall ). He can comment on a case in the hopes that he will then be able to address the output of the Court.…”

Section: Theory and Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He can comment on a case in the hopes that he will then be able to address the output of the Court. If he complains about a decision, he may hope to restrict the policy, perhaps through new legislation (Curry, Pacelle, and Marshall ). Or, if he praises the Court, he can seek to protect that policy from evasion.…”

Section: Theory and Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Presidential Rhetoric and U.S. Supreme Court Rulings: The Effect of Going Public on Citizen Evaluations of Institutions and Policy

Montgomery¹,

Rogol²,

Kingsland³

2019

Pres Stud Q

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Little is known about how the public responds to presidential statements on Supreme Court decisions. We argue that the president can serve as a source cue for both supporters and nonsupporters, shaping their opinions about the Supreme Court. This study offers a novel experimental test of presidential impact on individual assessments of the Court and potential sanctions. Our results suggest that individuals who approve of the president are likely to adjust their opinions to reflect the executive's stated position on Supreme Court decisions. However, those who do not support the president will react in a directionally opposed manner. Still, under the right conditions, our study suggests that a strategic president can take advantage of his ability to go public about the judicial branch.

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mentioning

confidence: 75%

Section: Theory and Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theory and Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theory and Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Presidential Rhetoric and U.S. Supreme Court Rulings: The Effect of Going Public on Citizen Evaluations of Institutions and Policy

Montgomery¹,

Rogol²,

Kingsland³

2019

Pres Stud Q

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show abstract

“…There is a substantial literature on the Supreme Court's interpretation of executive actions (Sheehan 1990;1992;McGuire 1998;King & Meernick 1999;Yates 1999;Curry, Pacelle & Marshall 2008) and the president's attempt to influence those decisions (Segal 1990;Bailey, Kamoie & Maltzman 2005;Black & Owens 2011;Black & Jones 2012), but the Supreme Court is unique because discretion over its docket allows the Court to avoid interbranch conflicts that can harm its reputation. The circuit courts do not have the same flexibility in controlling their docket, but their preference to maintain institutional legitimacy is no less (Carrubba 2009;Staton 2006).…”

Section: Strong Signals: Challenging the Presidentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidential Executive Orders: The Bureaucracy, Congress, and the Courts

Thunberg¹

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As the American president's use of executive orders continues gain prominence in the policy process, it is important that their use and limitations are fully understood. This research provides new insights to executive order use by addressing three questions. It asks how are executive orders used, when are executive orders used, and how does the judiciary respond to that use? I examine executive orders as bureaucratic controls, meant to alter agency behavior. I develop a framework based on the amount of discretion and authority the president grants executive agencies allowing for the identification four types of executive orders-routine, hortatory, coercive, and catalytic. Routine orders are used to accomplish common administrative tasks and have low grants of discretion and authority. Hortatory orders have high levels of discretion but low levels of authority and are used to investigate issue areas or coordinate information and advise the president. Coercive orders have high levels of authority and low levels of discretion and are used delegate specific authority and articulate specific tasks that need to be accomplished. Catalytic orders have high levels of discretion and authority, allowing the bureaucracy to both interpret and implement the executive order. When the president issues a specific type of executive order depends largely on the institutional context. There is a greater likelihood the president will issue a catalytic executive order in an attempt to circumvent Congress when he has low levels of partisan support. Finally, the U.S. Courts Appeals serves as a final check on the president's use of executive orders. While the courts rarely nullify an executive order, they do define the limits of their use by adding procedural limitations or constricting the reach an executive order has. These limitations develop a framework that presidents must work within when issuing future executive orders. This research advances the scholarly understanding of executive orders by examining them as bureaucratic controls that can be used in multiple ways. It moves away from dichotomous categorizations that limit explanatory value. Although executive orders are a strong presidential tool, this research shows there are checks on the exercise of that power by the judiciary.

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SCOTUS (Segment A)

Eksteen¹

2019

The Role of the Highest Courts of the United States of America and South Africa, and the European Court of Justice in Foreign A

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“An Informal and Limited Alliance”: The President and the Supreme Court

Cited by 11 publications

References 59 publications

Presidential Rhetoric and U.S. Supreme Court Rulings: The Effect of Going Public on Citizen Evaluations of Institutions and Policy

Presidential Rhetoric and U.S. Supreme Court Rulings: The Effect of Going Public on Citizen Evaluations of Institutions and Policy

Presidential Executive Orders: The Bureaucracy, Congress, and the Courts

SCOTUS (Segment A)

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