An information processing view of framing effects: The role of causal schemas in decision making

Abstract

People prefer a sure gain to a probable larger gain when the two choices are presented from a gain perspective, but a probable larger loss to a sure loss when the objectively identical choices are presented from a loss perspective. Such reversals of preference due to the context of the problem are known asframing effects. In the present study, schema activation and subjects' interpretations of the problems were examined as sources of the framing effects. Results showed that such effects could be eliminated by introducing into a problem a causal schema that provided a rationale for the reciprocal relationship between the gains and the losses. Moreover, when subjects were freed from framing they were consistently risk seeking in decisions about human life, but risk averse in decisions about property. Irrationality in choice behaviors and the ecological implication of framing effects are discussed.The same information presented in different forms can lead to different decisions. Changes in decision associated with different presentation forms are known asframing effects. For example, people's preference of choices can reverse as a function of the form in which logically identical questions are represented (Bradburn,

Risky choice framing: Task versions and a comparison of prospect theory and fuzzy‐trace theory

“…However, it is not obvious that people interpret saving 200 people as exactly 200 will be saved. They may think e.g., that about 200 will be saved, or that 200 people or more will be saved, or that 200 will be saved immediately and more will be saved later (e.g., Jou, Shanteau, & Harris, 1996;Kühberger, 1995;Macdonald, 1986). Moreover, it is unclear whether they take into account the fate of the unmentioned 400 people at all, and whether they do so in an exact or in an ambiguous way.…”

The Effects of Framing on Inter-group Negotiation

“…According to this model, a decision results from a comparison between the data describing the current situation and preexisting cognitive representations. A similar model suggests that the framing effect occurs because the alternatives are embedded in a cognitive causal schema (Jou et al 1996;Olekalns and Smith 2005). In this approach, the manner in which the alternatives are presented activates congruent schemata from the LTM, schemata that lead to a selective processing of the available information and finally to a decision-making bias.…”

On avoiding framing effects in experienced decision makers

“…Finally, a study by Jou, Shanteau, and Harris (1996) showed that the effect of positive-and negative-framed messages can be eliminated when the two messages are related by a causal schema that illustrates that they are equivalent. The second aim of the present study is to examine another potential method that can reduce or eliminate the framing effect.…”