An information-theoretic model for steganography

Cachin, Christian

doi:10.1016/j.ic.2004.02.003

Cited by 399 publications

(416 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…The notion of ǫ-security proposed by Cachin [21] states that a steganographic scheme is ǫ-secure if the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the cover and the stego signal distributions is less than a small number ǫ. This definition inherently assumes that cover signals can be described by "natural" distributions, which are known to the steganalyst.…”

Section: Resisting Blind Steganalysismentioning

confidence: 99%

YASS: Yet Another Steganographic Scheme That Resists Blind Steganalysis

2007

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Abstract.A new, simple, approach for active steganography is proposed in this paper that can successfully resist recent blind steganalysis methods, in addition to surviving distortion constrained attacks. We present Yet Another Steganographic Scheme (YASS), a method based on embedding data in randomized locations so as to disable the selfcalibration process (such as, by cropping a few pixel rows and/or columns to estimate the cover image features) popularly used by blind steganalysis schemes. The errors induced in the embedded data due to the fact that the stego signal must be advertised in a specific format such as JPEG, are dealt with by the use of erasure and error correcting codes. For the presented JPEG steganograhic scheme, it is shown that the detection rates of recent blind steganalysis schemes are close to random guessing, thus confirming the practical applicability of the proposed technique. We also note that the presented steganography framework, of hiding in randomized locations and using a coding framework to deal with errors, is quite simple yet very generalizable.

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Section: Resisting Blind Steganalysismentioning

confidence: 99%

YASS: Yet Another Steganographic Scheme That Resists Blind Steganalysis

2007

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“…Cachin [4] presented an information-theoretic model for steganography, which was the first to explicitly require that the stegotext distribution is indistinguishable from the covertext distribution to an adversary. Since the model is unconditional, a statistical information measure is used.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several information-theoretic formalizations [4,24,15] and one complexity-theoretic model [12] have addressed private-key steganography, where the participants share a common secret key. These models are all limited to a passive adversary, however, who can only read messages on the channel.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As in previous formalizations of steganography [4,12,9,22], the covertext distribution is publicly known in the sense that it is accessible through an oracle that samples the distribution. We introduce the notions of steganographic security against adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-CCA) and steganographic security against publicly-detectable replayable adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-PDR-CCA) and show that they are closely linked to the analogous notions for public-key cryptosystems, called security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (or CCAsecurity) [16] and security against publicly-detectable replayable adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks [5] (or PDR-CCA-security), respectively.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Public-Key Steganography with Active Attacks

Backes

Cachin

2005

Theory of Cryptography

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Abstract.A complexity-theoretic model for public-key steganography with active attacks is introduced. The notion of steganographic security against adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-CCA) and a relaxation called steganographic security against publicly-detectable replayable adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-PDR-CCA) are formalized. These notions are closely related to CCA-security and PDR-CCA-security for public-key cryptosystems. In particular, it is shown that any SS-(PDR-)CCA stegosystem is a (PDR-)CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem and that an SS-PDR-CCA stegosystem for any covertext distribution with sufficiently large min-entropy can be realized from any PDR-CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts.

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“…Program obfuscation was formalized and shown to be impossible in general [19], but subsequently some progress has been made in limited cases [20,21]. Steganography, in contrast, was formalized and shown to be possible, but at limited rates [22,23,24]. Surprisingly, formal definitions for watermarking security have only recently appeared in the literature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Weak to Strong Watermarking

Hopper

Molnár

Wagner

Theory of Cryptography

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Abstract. The informal goal of a watermarking scheme is to "mark" a digital object, such as a picture or video, in such a way that it is difficult for an adversary to remove the mark without destroying the content of the object. Although there has been considerable work proposing and breaking watermarking schemes, there has been little attention given to the formal security goals of such a scheme. In this work, we provide a new complexity-theoretic definition of security for watermarking schemes. We describe some shortcomings of previous attempts at defining watermarking security, and show that security under our definition also implies security under previous definitions. We also propose two weaker security conditions that seem to capture the security goals of practice-oriented work on watermarking and show how schemes satisfying these weaker goals can be strengthened to satisfy our definition.

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An information-theoretic model for steganography

Cited by 399 publications

References 3 publications

YASS: Yet Another Steganographic Scheme That Resists Blind Steganalysis

YASS: Yet Another Steganographic Scheme That Resists Blind Steganalysis

Public-Key Steganography with Active Attacks

From Weak to Strong Watermarking

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