An Informational Theory of Campaign Clientelism: The Case of Peru

Muñoz, Paula

doi:10.5129/001041514813623155

Cited by 76 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Voting for the winner increases the prospects of receiving patronage from successful candidates. However, without the information available from earlier elections, voters have to rely on much more unreliable cues, such as turnout at political rallies (Munoz, 2013), to determine likely winners and credible challengers. On the national presidential level, voters are often helped to act strategically by the numerous polls published in the media.…”

Section: Party Volatilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral coordination in Anglophone Africa

Wahman

2014

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Electoral coordination has been a primary concern for scholars of African politics, interested in topics such as ethnic conflict mitigation and democratisation, for decades. However, understanding of micro-level electoral coordination in Sub-Saharan Africa is generally still very limited. This study is the first to investigate voter coordination in SubSaharan Africa using constituency-level election results. Studying 20 single-member district elections during the period 1990-2010 in five Anglophone African countries (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia) demonstrates that many African elections continue to show low levels of electoral coordination. Using a multi-level regression analysis, the study shows that the most important explanation for low levels of coordination across Africa is high voter volatility. It is argued that insufficient information makes it hard for voters and candidates to act strategically. However, the level of democracy, which has been emphasised in earlier aggregate level research, does not significantly affect the level of coordination.

show abstract

Section: Party Volatilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral coordination in Anglophone Africa

Wahman

2014

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Indeed, the literature on vote buying shows that voters' low propensity to turn out to vote in elections is a key parameter that features prominently in brokers' targeting decisions (Nichter 2008;Stokes et al 2013;González-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2015). In addition to luring voters to the polls, gifts and favors are used to shore up attendance at rallies, thus fostering closer ties with candidates and parties (Muñoz 2014;Szwarcberg 2015).…”

Section: Are Remittance Recipients Good Targets For Vote Buying?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Remittances and Vote Buying

González-Ocantos

Jonge

Meseguer

2022

Lat. American Res. Rev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How does the presence of a large group of remittance recipients in the electorate affect the way political parties in Latin America plan their vote-buying operations during electoral campaigns? Existing research claims that remittances bolster the political autonomy of recipients, allowing them to escape clientelistic networks and making them less attractive targets from the point of view of party machines. Although in the long run remittances may undermine the effectiveness of clientelistic inducements, parties still have strong incentives to distribute gifts and favors among these voters. Cross-national survey evidence and an original list experiment fielded in the aftermath of El Salvador's 2014 presidential race support the view that remittances alter key attitudes and patterns of political behavior among recipients in ways that are relevant for the electoral strategies of party machines. In particular, remittance recipients are appealing targets for clientelistic exchanges due to the uncertainty of their turnout propensity and their distributive preferences. ¿Cómo impacta la presencia de un grupo considerable en el electorado que recibe remesas en la forma en la que los partidos políticos latinoamericanos diseñan estrategias de compra de voto en períodos electorales? Los estudios sobre el tema argumentan que las remesas aumentan la autonomía política de quienes las reciben, permitiéndoles escapar de las redes clientelares y haciéndolos menos atractivos desde el punto de vista de las maquinarias partidarias. Si bien es posible que en el largo plazo las remesas socaven la efectividad de las transferencias clientelares, sostenemos que los partidos enfrentan fuertes incentivos para continuar distribuyendo regalos y favores entre estos votantes. Utilizamos encuestas de opinión pública de corte transversal y un experimento de lista llevado a cabo luego de la elección presidencial del 2014 en El Salvador para mostrar que las remesas alteran posturas y comportamientos políticos relevantes para las estrategias de distribución de los partidos políticos. Específicamente, los receptores de remesas son blancos atractivos para intercambios clientelares debido a la incertidumbre sobre su propensión a participar en elecciones y a sus preferencias distributivas.

show abstract

“…Officials use forbearance as an informal, ad hoc welfare system to shore up their electoral support among poor and informal voters (Holland 2017, 7-9). Electoral support comes in the form of votes, as well as participation in campaign activities like canvassing and rallies (Auyero 2001(Auyero , 1999Muñoz 2014).…”

Section: Bribes Votes and Forbearancementioning

confidence: 99%

Do Poor Citizens Benefit from Mega-Events? São Paulo’s Street Vendors and the 2014 FIFA World Cup

Hummel

2018

Lat Am Polit Soc

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

International mega-events inject millions of dollars into host countries’ economies, yet few studies assess which citizens benefit from events and which do not. Governments justify their bids for mega-events by arguing that infrastructure projects, event-related jobs, and tourist spending benefit many citizens. However, researchers find mixed impacts on host economies and the average citizen. Scholars and activists argue that a few businesses benefit while high prices and event-specific laws exclude poor citizens. Under what conditions do poor citizens benefit from mega-events? This article analyzes original interview, survey, and participant observation data on street vendors in São Paulo, Brazil during the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The project finds that most street vendors lost money, while a minority made record profits. Those who benefited from the event used brokers, bribes, and pockets of forbearance to circumvent FIFA’s exclusionary rules.

show abstract

An Informational Theory of Campaign Clientelism: The Case of Peru

Cited by 76 publications

References 0 publications

Electoral coordination in Anglophone Africa

Electoral coordination in Anglophone Africa

Remittances and Vote Buying

Do Poor Citizens Benefit from Mega-Events? São Paulo’s Street Vendors and the 2014 FIFA World Cup

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About