An institution-based view of global IPR history

Peng, Mike W.; Ahlström, David; Carraher, Shawn M.; Shi, Weichao

doi:10.1057/s41267-016-0061-9

Cited by 161 publications

(168 citation statements)

References 74 publications

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“…This lack of significant correlation, partly driven by the MNEs' strategies, may in turn reduce the urgency for local policymakers in smaller countries to shore up their institutional development. The different toolboxes available to MNEs versus domestic firms may also explain why the rise of domestic industries usually generates stronger pressure on policy changes (Peng et al, 2017) than the presence of MNEs.…”

Section: Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Past studies have shown that the growth of domestic industries is often an instigator of institutional change (Peng, Ahlstrom, Carraher, & Shi, 2017). Moreover, the heterogeneity of firms in an economy -whether they are subsidiaries of MNEs or local entrepreneurs -leads to different trajectories of institutional development (Zhao & Yeung, 2008), the result of a co-evolutionary process of firm activities and institutional development (Cano-Kollmann, Cantwell, Hannigan, Mudambi, & Song, 2016;Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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IP litigation is local, but those who litigate are global

Beukel

Zhao

2018

J Int Bus Policy

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The importance of managing intellectual property (IP) on a global basis has been widely acknowledged by scholars and practitioners alike. However, we still have limited understanding of how multinational enterprises (MNEs) chooseamong all the countries they do business in -where to file for IP protection and where they exercise their IP rights through litigation. In this study, we examine MNEs' strategic choices of patenting and litigation locations through the lens of global competition. We argue that, while IP protection is local, relying on local policies and institutions, firms engaging in litigation are global. Thus, they prefer to litigate in the few countries with substantial track records to send strong signals to competitors elsewhere. This is particularly true for highly concentrated industries, where the same competitors face off in various countries, and for firms with radical innovations, which require expertise for a convincing verdict. We find supportive evidence of country, industry, and firm effects from extensive interviews with industry insiders and a comprehensive dataset documenting all the IP-related activities of Fortune Global 500 companies from 2007 to 2014. We discuss how the strategic choices made by global firms, in turn, influence the effectiveness of local policies and IP harmonization efforts across countries.

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Section: Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

IP litigation is local, but those who litigate are global

Beukel

Zhao

2018

J Int Bus Policy

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“…Risks are higher in entirely novel industries, which only Bfools^rush to enter, according to Aldrich and Fiol (1994), with untested products and business models. Furthermore, in new markets situated in weak institutional environments failure is easier to justify and fraud easier to disguise (Ahlstrom, Young, & Nair, 2002;Peng, Ahlstrom, Carraher, & Shi, 2017). A new government-subsidized industry faces additional complexities, as it introduces public goals (in this case, poverty alleviation and the use of lower-quality land) that organizations incorporate into their business models but that may not be sustainable.…”

Section: Limitations and Further Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

How powerful political ties appropriate resources and how weaker organizations protect themselves: A case study from Indonesia

Dieleman

Widjaja

2018

Asia Pac J Manag

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We advance the resource dependence literature on appropriation of organizational resources by powerful partners, focusing on political ties. Using a unique emerging market case of a venture with political ties, we advance theory by unpacking how political connections can hurt the organization by increasing the permeability of organizational boundaries. Our extensions highlight the crucial role of control mechanisms for politically connected organizations.Keywords Organizational boundary . Resource dependence . Political ties . PermeabilityOrganizations commonly seek to create linkages with external parties to access key resources and opportunities (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004), especially in emerging economies (Ahlstrom, Young, Nair, & Law, 2003). Yet these linkages also carry some costs and risks (Lin & Si, 2010). Researchers employing resource dependence theory (RDT) in particular have shown that risks are prevalent when there is a power imbalance, as powerful partners may appropriate organizational resources (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005;Emerson, 1962;Gulati & Singh, 1998;Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Although considerable research has advanced our knowledge of the conditions under which organizations seek partnerships (e.g., Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009;Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008), we know much less about the mechanisms by which powerful partners appropriate resources (Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016;Xia, 2011) and, in turn, how weaker organizations can seek to protect themselves (Katila et al., 2008). This is important as smaller firms increasingly enter new markets and must partner with larger (and sometimes) state linked partners creating relationships that need to be carefully managed (Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Rubanik, 2011). How companies can protect themselves against appropriation is a relatively recent but important research topic within RDT, especially in the context of powerful political ties, an area where capture by powerful partners is particularly acute. Political ties link the organization to the government with potentially beneficial effects (Hillman, 2005), but they cannot be fully controlled and may create their own problems such the extraction of rents or derailing strategy (Fan, Wong, & Li, 2007;Lin & Si, 2010;Shleifer & Vishny, 1994;Siegel, 2007;Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 2016;Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012). A new generation of RDT research suggests this problem is particularly salient in emerging economies, where new ventures often need powerful political ties to acquire resources such as licenses to operate and build legitimacy, but this can yield a power imbalance that may stimulate appropriation of firm resources (Mellahi et al., 2016).A few recent studies address the question how appropriation works. For instance, Sun et al. (2016) detailed how substantial shareholders colluded with political ties to expropriate minority shareholders, but they focus mostly on well-established publicly listed companies. Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) investig...

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“…Overall, at least two contributions emerge. First, we join Peng et al (2017) in demonstrating how history can be directly relevant in informing a crucial, ongoing debate. History can help to identify patterns and parallels that can inform present day explanations and provide potential propositions for future research, practice, and policy (Ferguson, 1999).…”

Section: Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We have neither covered IPR development in other parts of today's developed economies (those in Europe such as Great Britain and Germany and those in Asia such as Japan and Korea), nor that in other parts of developing economies (such as Brazil and India). Following Peng et al (2017), new insights will certainly emerge when future historically oriented IPR research probes these areas.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Research Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

History and the Debate Over Intellectual Property

Peng¹,

Ahlström

Carraher³

et al. 2017

Manag. Organ. Rev.

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This article responds to recent calls for organizational research to address larger, more globally relevant questions and to pay attention to history, by analyzing the crucial debate over intellectual property rights (IPR) between the United States and China. Despite the recent US position, the United States has not always been a leading IPR advocate. Rather, it was a leading IPR violator during the nineteenth century. An institution-based view of IPR history suggests that both the US refusal to protect foreign IPR in the nineteenth century and the current Chinese lack of enthusiasm to meet US IPR demands represent rational choices. However, as cost-benefit considerations change institutional transitions are possible. We predict that to the same extent the United States voluntarily agreed to strengthen IPR protection when its economy became sufficiently innovation-driven, China will similarly improve its IPR protection.

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An institution-based view of global IPR history

Cited by 161 publications

References 74 publications

IP litigation is local, but those who litigate are global

IP litigation is local, but those who litigate are global

How powerful political ties appropriate resources and how weaker organizations protect themselves: A case study from Indonesia

History and the Debate Over Intellectual Property

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