An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation

Abstract

Athlone Press. 1970. xliv and 343, arid xlii and 342 pp. (inc. indices). ! 2 6 each.]IT is well known that Jeremy Bentham's most important and original eontribution t o analytical jurisprudence lay buried for more than a century-anda-half beneath the mountain of papers bequeathed t o University College, London, before being disinterred by the ingencity of Professor Everett of Columbia University, who subsequently published the work under the title The h i t s of Jurisprudence Defined in 1945. Although high praise is due t o Professor Everett for his pioneering work, i t was obvious that his edition stood in need of substantial revision, and there could be no happier circumstance than the choice of a new editor in the person of Professor H a r t . As the most distinguished analytical jurist of our day and a worthy successor of Jeremy Bentham himself Professor H a r t has brought to bear both painstaking and loving scholarship as well as liis own magisterial command of general and legal phbilosophy to produce what must be universally recognised a s the definitive edition of Bentham's great work.Yet for all its importance both for our understanding of Bentham's thought as well as for the contribution that i t can still make t o the jurisprudence of our own day, it cannot be denied that the book is both tough and indigestible for even the most determined and informed of readers. Partly this is the result of the unfinished character of the work itself, but the familiar defects of Bentham's style (though sometimes relieved by pungent wit and vivid metaphors) also provide a pretty dense barrier even for a perceptive reader. As he approached the conclusion of his Introduction to the Principles of Norals and Legislation it had become increasingly apparent to Bentham that no far-reaching reform of the law, even though based on the true principles of the science of legislation as he conceived it, could be adequately attained without an understanding of the conceptual framework of the legal system. This he therefore set out t o explore i n depth in the present work. It was characteristic of the originality of his mind that he chose t o build up his analytical structure out of the seemingly simple question of the nature of the distinction between civil and penal law. I n the course of serutinising the implications of this distinction Bentham became persuaded that it was necessary t o create a whole new branch of logic, which he referred to as the "logic of the will." I n this way he anticipated many of the developments in the field which the modern logician refers to as " deontic " logic.This definitive edition of Of Lnws in General will finally lay to rest any lingering notion that it was Bentham's disciple, John Austin, who built up an original structure of analytical and conceptual jurisprudence out of fragmentary suggestions thrown off by the master in the course of his delving into the science of legislation and the projects of law reform dear t o his heart. As Professor H a r t has himself written of the present work, "...

Should we perform deceased donor liver transplantation after living donor liver transplantation has failed?

“…3 This includes the comparison of expected outcomes even if the liver diseases are different (eg, HCC versus a benign disease). Utility in health care 7 requires the consideration of the following questions:…”

Caring for parents: a consequentialist approach

“…39-64). 9 For some classical presentations, see Bentham (1970), and Sidgwick (1907). 10 It is possible to use the aggregate view to support the Moderate View.…”

Alternative farrowing accommodation: welfare and economic aspects of existing farrowing and lactation systems for pigs

“…Such a question involves both biological and ethical debate, which is beyond the scope of this review, but these weighting issues are discussed by other authors regarding welfare assessment (Bracke et al, 1999a). For the purposes of this paper, it was decided to give the benefit of the doubt and argue that each piglet is equal to the sow; thus, 'all to count for one, and nobody for more than one' (Bentham, 1789;Bracke et al, 1999a). Further prudence was demonstrated because weighting was only applied to attributes directly related to the piglet.…”