Given a set U of alternatives, a choice (correspondence) on U is a contractive map c defined on a family Ω of nonempty subsets of U. Semantically, a choice c associates to each menu A ∈ Ω a nonempty subset c(A) ⊆ A comprising all elements of A that are deemed selectable by an agent. A choice on U is total if its domain is the powerset of U minus the empty set, and partial otherwise. According to the theory of revealed preferences, a choice is rationalizable if it can be retrieved from a binary relation on U by taking all maximal elements of each menu. It is well-known that rationalizable choices are characterized by the satisfaction of suitable axioms of consistency, which codify logical rules of selection within menus. For instance, WARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference) characterizes choices rationalizable by a transitive relation. Here we study the satisfiability problem for unquantified formulae of an elementary fragment of set theory involving a choice function symbol c, the Boolean set operators and the singleton, the equality and inclusion predicates, and the propositional connectives. In particular, we consider the cases in which the interpretation of c satisfies any combination of two specific axioms of consistency, whose conjunction is equivalent to WARP. In two cases we prove that the related satisfiability problem is NP-complete, whereas in the remaining cases we obtain NP-completeness under the additional assumption that the number of choice terms is constant.In this paper we examine the decidability of the satisfiability problem connected to rational choice theory, which is a framework to model social and economic behavior. A choice on a set U of alternatives is a correspondence B → c(B) associating to "feasible menus" B ⊆ U nonempty "choice sets" c(B) ⊆ B. This choice can be either total (or full) -i.e, defined for all nonempty subsets of the ground set U of alternatives -or partial -i.e., defined only for suitable subsets of U .According to the Theory of Revealed Preferences pioneered by the economist Paul Samuelson [17], preferences of consumers can be derived from their purchasing habits: in a nutshell, an agent's choice behavior is observed, and her underlying preference structure is inferred. The preference revealed by a primitive choice is typically modeled by a binary relation on U . The asymmetric part of this relation is informative of a "strict revealed preference" of an item over another one, whereas its symmetric part codifies a "revealed similarity" of items. Then a choice is said to be rationalizable when the observed behavior can be univocally retrieved by maximizing the relation of revealed preference.Since the seminal paper of Samuelson, a lot of attention has been devoted to notions of rationality within the framework of choice theory: see, among the many contributions to the topic, the classical papers [15,2,16,14,19]. (See also the book [1] for the analysis of the links among the theories of * choice, preference, and utility. For a very recent contribution witnessing the ferve...