2020 IEEE 44th Annual Computers, Software, and Applications Conference (COMPSAC) 2020
DOI: 10.1109/compsac48688.2020.0-203
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An ISO-Compliant Test Procedure for Technical Risk Analyses of IoT Systems Based on STRIDE

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Cited by 11 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…Modelling approaches as a foundation for threat analyses, specifically also in IIoT contexts, vary, while the most common approach is to model the system as a data flow diagram (DFD) [13][14][15][16][17][18][19]. DFDs are based on the stages of digital data and model datain-use as processes, data-at-rest as data stores and data-in-transit as data flows.…”
Section: System Modellingmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Modelling approaches as a foundation for threat analyses, specifically also in IIoT contexts, vary, while the most common approach is to model the system as a data flow diagram (DFD) [13][14][15][16][17][18][19]. DFDs are based on the stages of digital data and model datain-use as processes, data-at-rest as data stores and data-in-transit as data flows.…”
Section: System Modellingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…STRIDE is the most common methodology for threat analyses, but due to its genesis in software security at Microsoft, suffers from shortcomings regarding use cases which increasingly differ from classical OS and software security [22]. However, STRIDE is used as a basis for threat analyses in the IIoT domain [14][15][16][17][18][19]. STRIDE provides six classes of common threats which facilitate the brainstorming process.…”
Section: Threat Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…i. ISO/IEC 27005: This standard provides guidelines for information security risk management. It can be applied to assess and manage risks associated with IoT deployments, helping organizations identify and mitigate potential threats ( Danielis et al, 2020 ).…”
Section: Risk Methodologies and Standards For Iotmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Seeam et al [70] consider this concept by evaluating various IoT domains and proposing the types of assets that may exist in an environment, as well as the fundamental security goals that threats could circumvent. Meanwhile, Danielis et al [49] use ISO/IEC 2700 to analyse IoT risk, using primary and supporting assets that are inputted within a dedicated worksheet with the various related attributes. In the work of Anisetti et al [45], an asset assessment phase is used to identify all assets for an organisation, with these assets holding value and nonfunctional properties.…”
Section: Identification Of Iot Assetsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Insight 1: For RQ1, asset classification needs to be dynamic, fitting various standards and prioritising valuable assets, with the ability to be updated when required. The issue with current methods is that specific critical assets may be overlooked, thus being forgotten in the risk management process, with such classifications like tangible/intangible assets [74], primary/supporting assets [49], functional/nonfunctional asset properties [45] not being IoT specific. This poses the question of how IoT assets should be broken down, for example, a device being of more than one asset due to sensor hardware and how device capabilities can be factored in.…”
Section: Identification Of Iot Assetsmentioning
confidence: 99%