Analogical reasoning is often employed in problem-solving and metaphor interpretation. This paper submits that, as a default, analogical reasoning addressing these different tasks employs different mapping strategies: In problem-solving, it employs analogymaximising strategies (like structure mapping, Gentner & Markman 1997); in metaphor interpretation, analogy-minimising strategies (like ATT-Meta, Barnden 2015). The two strategies interact in analogical reasoning with conceptual metaphors. This interaction leads to predictable fallacies. The paper supports these hypotheses through case-studies on 'mind'-metaphors from ordinary discourse, and abstract problem-solving in the philosophy of mind, respectively: It shows that (1) default metaphorical interpretations for vision-and spacecognition metaphors can be derived with a variant of the analogy-minimising ATT-Meta approach, (2) philosophically influential introspective conceptions of the mind can be derived with conceptual metaphors only through an analogy-maximising strategy, and (3) the interaction of these strategies leads to hitherto unrecognised fallacies in analogical reasoning with metaphors. This yields a debunking explanation of introspective conceptions.KEYWORDS: Analogical inference, conceptual metaphor, metaphor interpretation, mind metaphors, introspection, debunking explanation ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: For helpful comments on previous drafts and closely related material I am indebted to John Barnden, Christian Burgers, and Rachel Giora, an anonymous referee for this journal, and audiences at the 8 th AISB Symposium