Analysing Orchestrations Using Risk Profiles And Angel-Daemon Games

Gabarró, Joaquim; García, A. López; Serna, María; Kilpatrick, Peter; Stewart, Alan

doi:10.1007/978-0-387-09457-1_11

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Our work extends and generalises previous work for orchestrations which only utilised a robustness measure -see [15] for the initial definition of angeldaemon games, [16] for some elementary monotonicity properties of risk profiles and [17] for the monotonicity properties of uncertainty profiles. In this paper the following significant innovations have been introduced:…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 56%

Analysing Web-Orchestrations Under Stress Using Uncertainty Profiles

Gabarró

Serna

Stewart

2013

The Computer Journal

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An orchestration is a multi-threaded computation which invokes a number of remote services. In practice the responsiveness of a web-service fluctuates with demand; during surges in activity service responsiveness may be degraded, perhaps even to the point of failure. An uncertainty profile formalises a user's perception of the effects of stress on an orchestration of web-services; it describes a strategic situation, modelled by a zero-sum angel-daemon game. Stressed webservice scenarios are analysed, using game theory, in a realistic way, lying between over-optimism (services are entirely reliable) and over-pessimism (all services are broken). The "resilience" of an uncertainty profile can be assessed using the valuation of its associated zero-sum game. In order to demonstrate the validity of the approach we consider two measures of resilience and a number of different stress models. It is shown how (i) uncertainty profiles can be ordered by risk (as measured by game valuations) and (ii) the structural properties of risk partial orders can be analysed.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 56%

Analysing Web-Orchestrations Under Stress Using Uncertainty Profiles

Gabarró

Serna

Stewart

2013

The Computer Journal

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“…Risk profiles [5] are used to describe stressed environments in which two competing forces act on resources. Assume that the set of resources R in an allocation game is partitioned into two subsets A and D such that R = A∪D and A∩D = ∅.…”

Section: Risk Profiles and Weltanschauungmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Risk profiles were introduced in [3][4][5] to analyse network behaviour when a bounded number of services failed. However, risk profiles are sufficiently rich to allow the analysis of stressed web environments where networks may be under the influence of competing tendencies (one destructive, the other self-correcting).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stressed Web Environments as Strategic Games: Risk Profiles and Weltanschauung

Gabarró

Kilpatrick

Serna

et al. 2010

Trustworthly Global Computing

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Abstract. We consider the behaviour of a set of services in a stressed web environment where performance patterns may be difficult to predict. In stressed environments the performances of some providers may degrade while the performances of others, with elastic resources, may improve. The allocation of web-based providers to users (brokering) is modelled by a strategic non-cooperative angel-daemon game with risk profiles. A risk profile specifies a bound on the number of unreliable service providers within an environment without identifying the names of these providers. Risk profiles offer a means of analysing the behaviour of broker agents which allocate service providers to users. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of such a game in which no user can locally improve their choice of provider -thus, a Nash equilibrium is a viable solution to the provider/user allocation problem. Angel daemon games provide a means of reasoning about stressed environments and offer the possibility of designing brokers using risk profiles and Nash equilibria.

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