2017
DOI: 10.1070/qel16240
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Analysis of coherent quantum cryptography protocol vulnerability to an active beam-splitting attack

Abstract: We consider a new type of attack on a coherent quantum key distribution protocol [coherent one-way (COW) protocol]. The main idea of the attack consists in measuring individually the intercepted states and sending the rest of them unchanged. We have calculated the optimum values of the attack parameters for an arbitrary length of a channel length and compared this novel attack with a standard beam-splitting attack.

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Cited by 10 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Protocols that fall under this category include Coherent One-Way protocols [6][7][8]30], early versions of the Differential Phase Shift protocols [31,32], Strong Reference B92 protocols [33][34][35] and Y-00 protocols [36,37]. The full security proof includes analysis of a general coherent attack, but to upper-bound the key generation rate in these protocols, we may consider the beam-splitting (BS) attack [38][39][40], in which Eve steals the portion of the signal expected to be lost in the line and then retransmits the remaining part to Bob through an ideal channel.…”
Section: Analysis Schemementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Protocols that fall under this category include Coherent One-Way protocols [6][7][8]30], early versions of the Differential Phase Shift protocols [31,32], Strong Reference B92 protocols [33][34][35] and Y-00 protocols [36,37]. The full security proof includes analysis of a general coherent attack, but to upper-bound the key generation rate in these protocols, we may consider the beam-splitting (BS) attack [38][39][40], in which Eve steals the portion of the signal expected to be lost in the line and then retransmits the remaining part to Bob through an ideal channel.…”
Section: Analysis Schemementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that, in recent works [60][61][62][63], generalizations of the beam splitting attack for the B92, COW, and DPS protocols are considered. In these generalizations, the adversary can change the intensity of states and their further actions depend on whether they has managed to extract information from the part of the state diverted by the beam splitter.…”
Section: Beam Splitting Attackmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Examples include, in particular, the distributed-phase-reference (DPR) approach [11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19], specifically, differential-phase-shift [11][12][13][14][15] and COW [16][17][18][19] QKD protocols. A general security proof of DPR-QKD in a realistic setting has been missing, and only particular cases have been considered [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28]. This problem has been recently generally resolved, and lower bounds for a special variant of the COW protocol have been obtained [29].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%