Analysis of Complexity of Unsafe Behavior in Construction Teams and a Multiagent Simulation

Li, Zhen; Lv, Xiaofei; Zhu, Hongming; Sheng, Zhaohan

doi:10.1155/2018/6568719

Cited by 19 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 63 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Wang et al [ 88 ] used the Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) to describe the interaction mechanism between the work environment and personal behaviors in order to verify the relationships between discomfort in the work environment and unsafe behaviors. Li et al [ 89 ] analyzed the complex mechanism of unsafe behaviors of construction workers and built a three-layer structure model based on the Agent modeling method and conducted a multi-agent simulation analysis. Choi et al [ 44 ] established an agent model based on experience to investigate how workers’ social cognitive processes interact with safety management interventions and influence workers’ safety behaviors under different on-site risk conditions.…”

Section: A State-of-the-art Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Influencing Factors, Mechanism and Prevention of Construction Workers’ Unsafe Behaviors: A Systematic Literature Review

Meng

Liu

et al. 2021

IJERPH

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Unsafe behaviors of construction workers are one of the main causes of accidents at construction sites. The research on unsafe behaviors of workers helps to reduce the incidence of accidents and has attracted much attention. However, a systematic literature review in this field is still lacking, which hinders stakeholders’ comprehensive understanding of the unsafe behaviors of construction workers. Therefore, the aim of this study is to address this research gap based on retrieved literature from the Web of Science. First, the study conducted a descriptive analysis of the year, quantity, publishing organization, and keywords of the literature. In addition, three research topics were identified and discussed, including the influencing factors of construction workers’ unsafe behaviors, the formation mechanism of unsafe behaviors, and the pre-control methods of unsafe behaviors. Moreover, a research framework was proposed and future research directions were also suggested. The research findings promote stakeholders’ understanding of the influencing factors, formation mechanism, and pre-control methods of construction workers’ unsafe behaviors, and lead to future research directions in the studied field.

show abstract

Section: A State-of-the-art Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Influencing Factors, Mechanism and Prevention of Construction Workers’ Unsafe Behaviors: A Systematic Literature Review

Meng

Liu

et al. 2021

IJERPH

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This paper uses the multiple-agent modeling method to build a construction time optimization negotiation model because of the multiple stages and uncertainty of the negotiation process [42][43][44]. Various behaviors and phenomena will "emerge" from bottom to top through interaction between the negotiating agents [45]. We extract and analyze the changing parameters which interest us and then determine their impacts on the strategy selection and performance of the main agents by constructing a controllable and reproducible computational model.…”

Section: The Revenue-sharing Negotiation Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiation for Time Optimization in Construction Projects with Competitive and Social Welfare Preferences

Meng

et al. 2019

Complexity

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Construction time optimization is affected greatly by the negotiation between owners and contractors, whose progress is dictated by their desire to maximize system revenues. This paper builds an agent-based model and designs an experimental scenario in which the contractor has competitive and social welfare preferences relevant to the Chinese context; we subdivide competitive preference into greed and jealousy components and subdivide social welfare preference into generosity and sympathy components. We analyze the impacts of these different contractor preferences on the revenue-sharing coefficient, negotiation success rate, and negotiation time when negotiation reaches agreement. The results show that the jealousy component of competitive preference has an important influence on improving the income of the subject, while the greed component does not significantly enhance the revenue-sharing coefficient. The sympathy component of social welfare preference does not have an influence on the revenue-sharing coefficient no matter the strength of the generosity component. Increasing the greed component of competitive preference will lead to the extension of negotiation time and, to a certain extent, to the reduction of the negotiation success rate; the sympathy component of social welfare preference does not have an influence on negotiation time no matter the strength of the generosity preference.

show abstract

“…Cooperative behavior is a way to pursue common goals through cooperation [22][23][24][25], and many scholars have studied the benefits of cooperative behavior in engineering. For instance, Mohebbi and Li [26] proposed a supplier cooperation algorithm and their simulation results show that long-term cooperation between a network of suppliers can increase the average personal profit of the network's members.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects

et al. 2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects.

show abstract

Analysis of Complexity of Unsafe Behavior in Construction Teams and a Multiagent Simulation

Cited by 19 publications

References 63 publications

Influencing Factors, Mechanism and Prevention of Construction Workers’ Unsafe Behaviors: A Systematic Literature Review

Influencing Factors, Mechanism and Prevention of Construction Workers’ Unsafe Behaviors: A Systematic Literature Review

Negotiation for Time Optimization in Construction Projects with Competitive and Social Welfare Preferences

Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About