Analysis of epidemic vaccination strategies on heterogeneous networks: Based on SEIRV model and evolutionary game

Abstract

Nowadays, vaccination is the most effective way to control the epidemic spreading. In this paper, an epidemic SEIRV (susceptible-exposed-infected-removed -vaccinated) model and an evolutionary game model are established to analyze the difference between mandatory vaccination method and voluntary vaccination method on heterogeneous networks. Firstly, we divide the population into four categories, including susceptible individuals, exposed individuals, infected individuals and removed individuals. Based on the mean field approximation theory, differential equations are developed to characterize the changes of the proportions of the four groups over time under mandatory vaccination. Then through the analysis of the differential equations, the disease-free equilibrium point (DFE) and the endemic disease equilibrium point (EDE) are obtained. Also, the basic reproduction number is obtained by the next-generation matrix method and the stability analysis of the equilibrium points is performed. Next, by considering factors such as vaccination cost, treatment cost and government subsidy rate, differential equations are established to represent the change of vaccination rate over time. By analyzing the final vaccination coverage rate, we can get the minimum vaccination cost to make infectious disease disappear. Finally, the Monte Carlo method is used for numerical simulation to verify the results obtained from the theoretical analysis. Using the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic data from Wuhan, China, the experimental results show that when the effectiveness rate of vaccination is 0.75, the vaccination cost is not higher than 0.886 so that the vaccination strategy can be spread among the population. If mandatory vaccination is adopted, the minimum vaccination rate is 0.146.

Stability Analysis of Spread of Infectious Diseases COVID-19 Using SEIAR-V1V2Q Model for Asymptomatic Condition with Runge-Kutta Order 4

“…The disease spread model is subject to modification by including vaccine and quarantine treatment to assess the rate of change in disease transmission [24,25]. Figure 1 shows the modified SEIAR model, and the variables used will be explained in Table 1.…”

Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

“…It can be noted that after substituting the above ten local equilibrium points into the Jacobian matrix, except , and , the rest are 0, so whether the model can stabilize the equilibrium only needs to consider the values of these three. According to the existing research [ 48 ], scholars believe that when the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are less than 0, the evolution reaches a stable state. Based on this, the values of ten equilibrium points are substituted into A1, A2 and A3, and the used values are shown in Table 5 .…”

Exploring epidemic voluntary vaccinating behavior based on information-driven decisions and benefit-cost analysis

“…considered an epidemiological game-theoretic model to study the effect of altruism on disease burden in a community [26] . In the current disease model research, some scholars integrated behavioral dynamics into game theory to analyze the impact of individual behavior strategy on disease transmission and vaccination coverage by adopting the Nash strategy, establishing payoff matrix and Femi update rules [ 27 , 28 ]. Another approach of choice in evolutionary game theory for many researchers is the called replicator equation, the best response, the smoothed best response, can be expressed as the function of the total payoff of the game which concluded the positive and negative payoffs [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] .…”