Analysis of Flooding DoS Attacks Utilizing DNS Name Error Queries

Wang, Zheng

doi:10.3837/tiis.2012.10.018

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…There are many techniques available to detect and mitigate DoS attacks in IP‐address‐based communications. They include from simple monitoring of traffic anomalies to highly advanced solutions using artificial intelligence, per‐flow‐based traffic analysis, and many more . Their applicability in CCN paradigm is yet to be checked according to its routing mechanism.…”

Section: Discussion and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Denial‐of‐service in content centric (named data) networking: a tutorial and state‐of‐the‐art survey

Aamir¹,

Zaidi

2014

Security Comm Networks

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Content centric networking (CCN) is a paradigm shift from current Internet protocol‐address‐based communication model to content‐oriented model in computer networks. Like traditional networks, it is identified that CCN is also vulnerable to many security threats including denial‐of‐service (DoS). This fact has recently caught a considerable attention in research community while different proposals of defense are being published. In this paper, we provide a literature review on different types of possible DoS attacks in CCN and their proposed countermeasures. DoS attacks can be triggered in CCN to exhaust resources within a CCN router or the ultimate content source(s). Two characteristics of CCN, that is, state maintenance of forwarded requests in a router using pending interest table and the fact that a response (content) follows the same path in reverse direction through which the corresponding request (interest) travels have been taken as major advantages to fight against DoS attacks in CCN under different proposed approaches. This survey makes a contribution by (a) highlighting state‐of‐the‐art work in a tutorial manner on the exploration of different DoS attacks and their countermeasures in CCN, (b) identifying some potential problems of current CCN features and existing proposals of defense, and (c) forecasting and providing an overview of a few possible future techniques to help researchers fight against CCN‐DoS attacks. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Section: Discussion and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Denial‐of‐service in content centric (named data) networking: a tutorial and state‐of‐the‐art survey

Aamir¹,

Zaidi

2014

Security Comm Networks

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“…Hence, by adopting ECS, the DNS cache will be expanded and complicated by a factor of the number of ECS scopes. The vulnerability may be exploited in DoS attacks, which aim at bypassing caching and flooding authoritative servers [ 37 , 38 ]. A DNS privacy study [ 32 ] pinpointed the limitation, which applies to any end-to-end DNS proposal.…”

Section: Remote Dns Problem and Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution and challenges of DNS-based CDNs

Wang

Huang

Rose

2018

Digital Communications and Networks

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DNS-based server redirecting is considered the most popular means of deploying CDNs. However, with the increasing use of remote DNS, DNS-based CDNs face a great challenge in performance degradation. To address this issue, encouraging progress has been made in both industry and research communities. In this article, state-of-art solutions for the remote DNS problem are discussed at first. Next, privacy concerns about DNS-based CDNs, including client location as well as redirection privacy, are identified and a representative solution is summarized. Finally, the solution is compared to those in prior works under different measures, and a discussion on DNS-based CDN applications is provided. A model is also established to deepen the understanding of CDN performance. We believe that this survey will shed light on the application of DNS-based CDNs, and it is expected to provide design guidelines to CDN service providers.

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“…1) Randomizing query names: DNS caching mechanism searches for the item in cache that exactly matches the query name in question. So if query names may be sufficiently randomized, there is little chance of repeated query names within one TTL and thus the cache hit rate will be close to zero [26] (illustrated in the question in blue in Fig. 1).…”

Section: A Avoiding Cache Hitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Your DNS Recursion Really Time Out as Intended? A Timeout Vulnerability of DNS Recursive Servers

Wang

2016

Preprint

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Parallelization is featured by DNS recursive servers to do time-consuming recursions on behalf on clients. As common DNS configurations, recursive servers should allow a reasonable timeout for each recursion which may take as long as several seconds. However, it is proposed in this paper that recursion parallelization may be exploited by attackers to compromise the recursion timeout mechanism for the purpose of DoS or DDoS attacks. Attackers can have recursive servers drop early existing recursions in service by saturating recursion parallelization. The key of the proposed attack model is to reliably prolong service times for any attacking queries. As means of prolong service times, serval techniques are proposed to effectively avoiding cache hit and prolonging overall latency of external DNS lookups respectively. The impacts of saturated recursion parallelization on timeout are analytically provided. The testing on BIND servers demonstrates that with carefully crafted queries, an attacker can use a low or moderate level of query load to successfully overwhelm a target recursive server from serving the legitimate clients.

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Analysis of Flooding DoS Attacks Utilizing DNS Name Error Queries

Cited by 9 publications

References 13 publications

Denial‐of‐service in content centric (named data) networking: a tutorial and state‐of‐the‐art survey

Denial‐of‐service in content centric (named data) networking: a tutorial and state‐of‐the‐art survey

Evolution and challenges of DNS-based CDNs

Does Your DNS Recursion Really Time Out as Intended? A Timeout Vulnerability of DNS Recursive Servers

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