Analyzing a socially responsible closed-loop distribution channel with recycling facility

Modak, Nikunja Mohan; Sinha, Sudipta; Panda, Subhasis; Kazemi, Nima

doi:10.1007/s42452-019-1173-1

Cited by 20 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…On this basis, Shu et al [48] studied the influence of manufacturer's CSR behavior on enterprises' carbon emissions, waste product recycling and product pricing decisions. Modak et al [37] further expanded the existing research model to study the impact of manufacturer's CSR behavior and retailer competition on CLSC decisions. Liu and Xiao [31] studied the CSR preferences of manufacturer and consumers and the impact of green consumers on CLSC reverse channel structure selection, new product pricing, and recovery ratios.…”

Section: Csr and Sustainable Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manufacturer’s cooperation strategy of closed-loop supply chain considering corporate social responsibility

2021

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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a popular and important strategy for corporate operation and sustainable development. Meanwhile, many social or environmental incidents that occur in one enterprise could bring huge risk or disruption for the entire supply chain. This study discusses the manufacturer’s cooperation strategy of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of a dominant manufacturer with CSR behavior consciousness, a retailer with CSR investment, and a third-party recycler. In the CSR-CLSC, the manufacturer exhibits CSR behavior consciousness through considering stakeholders welfare, the retailer makes CSR investment through profit donation and the third-party recycler exhibits CSR activity through product recycling. And under the Stackelberg Game setting, we formulate four different decision-making models to investigate the interaction between manufacturer’s CSR behavior consciousness and retailer’s CSR investment, as well as their impact on the manufacturer’s cooperative strategy selection and CLSC operation. The results show that both the CSR behavior consciousness of manufacturer and CSR investment of retailer are conducive to reducing the wholesale price of new products, enhancing the recycling rate of waste products and improving the performance of CSR-CLSC members, and both of them have the function of mutual incentives. The vertical cooperation strategy of manufacturer is conducive to increasing the overall performance of CSR-CLSC, and compared with the cooperation with the third-party recycler, the manufacturer has stronger motivation to cooperate with the retailer, and it is also more beneficial to improving the CSR investment level, the waste product recycling rate, and the performance of CSR-CLSC members.

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Section: Csr and Sustainable Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manufacturer’s cooperation strategy of closed-loop supply chain considering corporate social responsibility

2021

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“…ey insisted that the channel's nonprofit maximizing motive through corporate social responsibility practices generated a higher profit margin than the profit maximizing objective and that there must be a recycling limit for the optimal benefit of the channel. Modak et al [41] examined the influence of a manufacturer's social responsibility on the collection activity of a third party in a CLSC and showed that product recycling is directly affected by the manufacturer's corporate social responsibility concerns and that there must be a recycling threshold for the optimal benefit. Modak and Kelle [42] suggested social work donation (SWD) as a tool of CSR in a CLSC considering carbon taxes and demand uncertainty.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

Lee

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.

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“…e results showed that a reasonable revenue-sharing contract is essential to increase supply chain members' profits even under low-carbon conditions [53]. Modak et al concluded that the optimal recycling rate increases with the CSR activity of the manufacturer, and a profit-sharing contract provides the best channel performance in a closedloop distribution channel consisting of a socially responsible manufacturer, multiple retailers, and a third-party collector [54]. Feng infers that win-win results can be achieved by establishing profit-sharing contracts considering the preference of green consumers [55].…”

Section: Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on Green Supply Chain Cooperation and Carbon Tax Policy considering Consumer’s Behavior

Liu

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Carbon tax policy has been shown to be an effective incentive for the reduction of carbon emissions, and it also profoundly influences supply chain cooperation. This paper explores the interaction between carbon taxes and green supply chain cooperation. Specifically, we analyze the impact of a carbon tax on green supply chain coordination and further optimize the carbon tax to achieve a win-win situation for both the supply chain and the environment. Because consumer’s behavior has a significant impact on green product demand, we consider the problems above under two types of consumer’s behavior characteristics: consumer’s environmental awareness and consumer’s reference behavior. A game-theoretic model is employed to describe a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, combining important factors such as the carbon tax rate, green investment coefficient, and degree of reference effect. Then, we obtain the optimal carbon tax rate by balancing the total tax revenue and product greenness. A revenue-sharing contract is introduced to achieve green supply chain coordination, and the impact of the carbon tax on coordination is analyzed. The results show the following. (1) The carbon tax rate and the difference between the power of the manufacturer and retailer are the main factors determining green supply chain coordination. (2) Maximum greenness can be achieved when development costs are higher, while the maximum tax revenue is obtained when the development cost is lower, but with the loss of greenness. (3) If the power of the manufacturer is low, coordination can be achieved under the optimal carbon tax. If the power of the manufacturer is at a medium level, coordination can be achieved by increasing the carbon tax; as a result, increased greenness will be realized, but with the loss of tax revenue. However, when the power of the manufacturer is strong, coordination cannot be achieved. (4) Price reference behavior can promote supply chain coordination, but consumer’s environmental awareness cannot.

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Analyzing a socially responsible closed-loop distribution channel with recycling facility

Cited by 20 publications

References 37 publications

Manufacturer’s cooperation strategy of closed-loop supply chain considering corporate social responsibility

Manufacturer’s cooperation strategy of closed-loop supply chain considering corporate social responsibility

Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

Study on Green Supply Chain Cooperation and Carbon Tax Policy considering Consumer’s Behavior

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