Analyzing disaster risks and plans: An avian flu example

Abstract

Narrative approaches to analyzing risks seek to identify the variables critical to creating and controlling a risk, then to instantiate them in terms of coherent themes (e.g., organizational failure, strategic surprise). Computational approaches to analyzing risks seek to identify the same critical variables, then to instantiate them in terms of their probability. Disaster risk analysis faces complex, novel processes that strain the capabilities of both approaches. We propose an approach that integrates elements of each, relying on what we call structured scenarios and computable models. It is illustrated by framing the analysis of plans for a possible avian flu pandemic. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006Scenarios, Uncertainty, Risk analysis, Judgment, Avian flu,

Assessing what to address in science communication

“…For example, during the 2005 threat of an H5N1 influenza outbreak, infectious disease experts indicated that vaccines would likely not be available in time, and therefore, they recommended nonpharmaceutical interventions, such as increased hand washing or use of face masks (20,21). However, experts had no evidence to indicate how well people would be able to implement these recommendations during a pandemic influenza outbreak (20,21) or what information people would need to overcome any potential barriers to effective implementation (22). These findings highlight the need for social science research with intended audience members (20,21).…”

Applying the science of communication to the communication of science

“…They may also need an understanding of why experts disagree. Achieving that understanding will require communications that afford them "mental models" of the relevant climate science, showing the uncertainties that are inherent to that science (Bostrom et al 1994;Fischhoff et al 2006;Kempton et al 1995;Morgan et al 2002;Reynolds et al 2010). Knowing more about why scientists bicker may matter more than knowing more about their results (Sokolow 2011).…”

Analysing the risks of individual and collective intentionality

“…This is perhaps explained by the way in which the complex pattern of social agreements and collective intentions are 'weightless' to us, in the sense that, having been brought up in a culture, we tend to take it for granted (Searle 1995, 4). We are used to the idea that computationally-oriented risk analysts self-censor out of their analyses those elements where 'data' are lacking (Fischhoff et al 2006), which seems to mean a concentration on material properties and observable behaviours to the exclusion of malleable, mental states like intentionality. And our methods of human reliability analysis emphasise random variations in performance, not deliberate, wilful action -despite its central role in events like the Chernobyl accident (Rosness 1992).…”

“…Thus, whether the intention of a risk assessment is to influence the system under analysis or come to some summative view of the risks it produces is important to how it is interpreted. We have also come to accept that an assessment 'expresses a political-ethical position, most obviously in its choice of outcomes to predict' (Fischhoff et al 2006). Thus lying behind it is not just an intention to perform a risk assessment but to perform an assessment of particular classes of risk.…”