Analyzing Distributed Functions in an Integrated Hazard Analysis

Abstract

Large scale integration of today's aerospace systems is achievable through the use of distributed systems. Validating the safety of distributed systems is significantly more difficult as compared to centralized systems because of the complexity of the interactions between simultaneously active components. Integrated hazard analysis (IHA), a process used to identify unacceptable risks and to provide a means of controlling them, can be applied to either centralized or distributed systems. IHA, though, must be tailored to fit the particular system being analyzed. Distributed systems, for instance, must be analyzed for hazards in terms of the functions that rely on them. This paper will describe systems-oriented IHA techniques (as opposed to traditional failure-event or reliability techniques) that should be employed for distributed systems in aerospace environments. Special considerations will be addressed when dealing with specific distributed systems such as active thermal control, electrical power, command and data handling, and software systems (including the interaction with fault management systems). Because of the significance of second-order effects in large scale distributed systems, the paper will also describe how to analyze secondary functions to secondary functions through the use of channelization. = worst case effect of hazard which manifests itself Primary System = system under assessment whose hazards directly result in undesired events SAVIO = Software and Avionics Integration Office Secondary Hazard Effect = additional effects of hazard which manifests itself Secondary System = a supporting system whose failures can induce undesired affects in the system it supports Nomenclature

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