2013
DOI: 10.1037/a0028232
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Anchoring and adjustment during social inferences.

Abstract: Simulation theories of social cognition suggest that people use their own mental states to understand those of others-particularly similar others. However, perceivers cannot rely solely on self-knowledge to understand another person; they must also correct for differences between the self and others. Here we investigated serial adjustment as a mechanism for correction from self-knowledge anchors during social inferences. In 3 studies, participants judged the attitudes of a similar or dissimilar person and repo… Show more

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Cited by 118 publications
(186 citation statements)
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References 37 publications
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“…Moreover, researchers have observed Anchoring and Adjustment Theory in many natural contexts and consider this theory as 'extremely robust' (Plous, 1993). In psychology, for example, Tamir and Mitchell (2013) found that people like to use themselves as a relevant starting point for social inference.…”
Section: Anchoring and Adjustment Theorymentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Moreover, researchers have observed Anchoring and Adjustment Theory in many natural contexts and consider this theory as 'extremely robust' (Plous, 1993). In psychology, for example, Tamir and Mitchell (2013) found that people like to use themselves as a relevant starting point for social inference.…”
Section: Anchoring and Adjustment Theorymentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Although people's mental models were highly accurate, they were also somewhat egocentric (SI Text). People often draw on their privileged access to their own mental states when making inferences about others (23)(24)(25). This strategy should work particularly well when a person's emotion transitions mirror those found in the population.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The similarity between concepts of God's extraordinary mind and concepts of ordinary human minds suggests that, to understand God's mind, people may represent human minds and then adjust up (e.g., God knows more than humans) or down (e.g., God is less capable of feeling hungry than humans). The literature on anchoring and adjustment in reasoning shows that people often make estimates of unknown quantities by “anchoring” on salient information and then adjust insufficiently, leading to final estimates that remain close to the original anchor (e.g., Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2006; Epley & Gilovich, 2004, 2005; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). If people anchor on human minds in general or on their own minds in particular (e.g., Epley et al, 2009; Ross et al, 2012) and then adjust to represent God's mind, their final representation of God's mind may still largely resemble that of human minds.…”
Section: Why Adults Anthropomorphize Godmentioning
confidence: 99%