Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

Alós–Ferrer, Carlos; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel

doi:10.1007/s40505-017-0130-7

Cited by 9 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Our work shares a similar spirit with Thomson (1981), Anbarcı (1995), Alós-Ferrer et al (2018), and Haake and Qin (2018) in that these papers also studied reference points and/or classes of bargaining solutions. Thomson (1981) introduced the concept of a reference function, which determines a reference point for each bargaining problem-as a function of the problem.…”

Section: Example 3 (Inspired Bymentioning

confidence: 76%

“…The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution appears to be a special case of this class. Recently, Alós-Ferrer et al (2018) introduced the negotiated aspirations solution that proposes the best allocation in the direction of the ideal point starting at an endogenous reference point. Their reference point is endogenous in that it is a function of the ideal point and the bargaining power.…”

Section: Example 3 (Inspired Bymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the salience and power of reference points in determining the effective anchors and aspirations in bargaining problems. Along this line, we enrich the analysis of the standard bargaining model with two new parameters: the first parameter can be interpreted as the effectiveness (or salience) of the reference point in determining the anchor, whereas the second parameter can be interpreted as its effectiveness in shaping agents' aspirations. Utilizing these parameters, we provide a unifying framework for the study of bargaining problems with a reference point. The two-parameter family of bargaining solutions we obtain encompasses some well-known solutions as special cases. We offer multiple characterizations for each individual member of this family as well as two characterizations for the whole solution family in bilateral bargaining problems.

show abstract

Section: Example 3 (Inspired Bymentioning

confidence: 76%

Section: Example 3 (Inspired Bymentioning

confidence: 99%

Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…and u(U ) = (u 1 (U ), u 2 (U )) is called the utopia point. The generalized KS solution (see, [1]) is defined to be (see Figure 1)…”

Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nash [17] assumes all bargainers have the same bargaining power, hence all bargainers' fears of disagreements must be the same; while Svejnar [22] assumes the bargainers may have different bargaining powers, hence all bargainers' fears of disagreements must be proportional to their relative bargaining powers. In contrast, the generalized KS solution (KS solution for short) emphasizes on bargainers' aspirations, i.e., another axiom called "Individual Monotonicity (IM)" applies (see, [1]): If a bargainer's alternatives are increased while all other bargainers' best choices stay the same, then the bargainer with increased alternatives should become better off. In general, these two bargaining solutions may act differently due to different fairness considerations.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining in a multi-echelon supply chain with power structure: KS solution vs. Nash solution

Zhong¹,

Xie²,

Shen³

2022

JIMO

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper studies a multi-echelon serial supply chain with negotiations over wholesale prices between successive echelons. Two types of bargaining systems with power structures are compared: one adopts the generalized Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution and the other adopts the generalized Nash solution. Our analyses show that, for any KS bargaining system with a given bargaining power structure, there is a Nash bargaining system with another bargaining power structure, such that the two systems are the same. However under the same power structure, the generalized KS solution results in lower wholesale price and higher total supply chain profit than the Nash solution does. Finally, we characterize the necessary and sufficient condition of the bargaining power structure under which the KS bargaining system Pareto dominates the Nash bargaining system, and the set characterized by such condition does not shrink to an empty set as the number of echelons increases to infinity.</p>

show abstract

“…The WPLS is always individually rational while satisfying desirable properties. From the viewpoint of game players, the concept of WPLS can be seen as the normalized weighted equal losses solution [8]- [9].…”

Section: A Technical Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining-Based Spectrum Allocation Algorithm for High-Speed Railway Communications

Kim

2021

IEEE Access

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The explosive growth of data traffic in the high-speed railway (HSR) communications has attracted much research attention to boost technical innovations and developments for the next generation mobile communication networks. However, traditional terrestrial communication network is difficult to support various HSR service requirements while ensuring seamless coverage in ultra-wide regions. In this study, we develop a new spectrum allocation scheme for HSR communications. By leveraging satellite communications, our proposed scheme is implemented on the integrated terrestrial-satellite network (ITSN) platform. Based on the weighted proportional gain and loss bargaining solutions, our approach can adaptively share the limited ITSN spectrum resource with its tight interaction and complementary characteristics to satellite and terrestrial networks. To take full advantages of collaborative control process, the proposed coordinated bargaining paradigm explores the mutual benefits and achieve a reciprocal consensus under dynamically changing HSR communications. The obtained solution has globally desirable features to provide guidelines for the ITSN operation. Finally, numerical results demonstrate the strengths of our proposed scheme by using extensive simulations, and we highlight the open issues and future directions.

show abstract

Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

Cited by 9 publications

References 34 publications

Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions

Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions

Bargaining in a multi-echelon supply chain with power structure: KS solution vs. Nash solution

Bargaining-Based Spectrum Allocation Algorithm for High-Speed Railway Communications

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About