“…The conceptual problem appears to stem from the task of trying to place physical and mental illnesses on the same medical (positivist) footing, m order to reduce the controversial nature of the distance between the two (Sedgwick 1972) This has led to the task of trying to purge all cultural norms (with their variability from society to soaety) from the concept of mental illness (Wootton 1959) To do tbs, though, requires a microscopic and molecular analysis of the 'objective' nature of human behaviour This is not only highly problematic but has so far been unsuccessful and is, therefore, an idealistic notion and not one that has current practical usage According to Sedgwick (1972) this is only one way of creating such congruity By working in the reverse direction (relativism rather than positivism), the character of both physical illness and mental illness can be revealed as 'soaal constructions' Below the level of mankind all hfe forms m nature exist outside the constructs of illness, disease and, therefore, treatment, until man intervenes with his uiuque definitions based upon his own interests and concerns For example, our interest in the animal world IS based ufK)n food and/or other social economic uses, witnessed by the general lack of concern over the diseases that affect squirrels or foxes Once physical illness is grounded as 'culturally relative' (le ascnbed by individuals or by others according to the dominant theory of the culture regarding causes of illness -invasion by germs or evil spints) the variability of what counts as 'mental illness' does not render the term as problematic as cntics of traditional psychiatry hold As a value-laden concept, 'all sickness is essentially deviancy', according to Sedgwick (1972) whereby no attnbution of sickness to any being can be made without the expectation of some alternative state of dtairs whidi is considered more desirable Thus, m the absence of a normative alternative, the definition of illness has no meaning Intrinsic to this view is the point that there are no 'illnesses or diseases in nature' outside of the sigmficantx that man attaches to them The medical enterprise (both physical and mental) is, therefore, seen as being value-loaded, it is not simply an appbed biology, but a biology applied in accordance with the dictates of soaal interest (Sedgwick 1972) Busfield (1986) agrees with the analysis made by Sedgwick, regarding the role of values m concepts of health and illness, but argues that although many theonsts make a case for widespread concern about the operation of values throughout mediane, there are especial grounds for concern in the mental health held…”