Anger and its desires

Abstract

The orthodox view of anger takes desires for revenge or retribution to be central to the emotion. In this paper, I develop an empirically informed challenge to the retributive view of anger. In so doing, I argue that a distinct desire is central to anger: a desire for recognition. Desires for recognition aim at the targets of anger acknowledging the wrong they have committed, as opposed to aiming for their suffering. In light of the centrality of this desire for recognition, I argue that the retributive view of anger should be abandoned. I consider and dismiss two types of moves that can be made on the part of a proponent of the orthodox view in response to my argument. I propose that a pluralist view, which allows for both retribution and recognition in anger, is to be preferred.

Fitting Diminishment of Anger: A Permissivist Account

“…Therefore, anger can diminish fittingly because the anger can be satisfied through addressing the imbalance. Martha Nussbaum (2015), Samuel Reis-Dennis (2019), and Laura Silva (2022) are three philosophers who understand anger in this way. Nussbaum and Reis-Dennis argue that anger is often a response to a perceived down-ranking of one's status, and that its aim is to restore one's status through retribution, 2 while Silva challenges this retributive view of anger, suggesting, instead, that anger is primarily aimed at recognition.…”

On being angry at oneself

“…Despite self-anger having been systematically neglected in the contemporary literature on anger (Callard, 2020;Cherry & Flanagan, 2018;Cogley, 2014;Na'aman, 2019;Nussbaum, 2016;Pettigrove, 2012;Silva, 2021), 3 acknowledgement that anger can be self-directed is actually widespread in this literature, such that inattention to self-anger is not explained by scepticism regarding the phenomenon. Self-anger is thus both ubiquitously acknowledged, and thoroughly undertheorized in the anger literature.…”

Ativismo emocional: contribuições para o debate acerca do significado moral e político da raiva

“…A forma mais viável de superar esse dilema normativo é verificar a emoção através de seu contexto, ao contrário de deslocada de suas nuances políticas. Laura Silva (2020;2021), filósofa também contemporânea que desenvolve contraposições a argumentação de Nussbaum, defende uma tese similar à de Cherry ao afirmar que a raiva possui uma pluralidade de desejos e que esses desejos e os comportamentos provenientes deles só podem ser determinados e analisados a partir de moderadores, dentre eles os contextuais. Ela aponta pesquisas empíricas sobre a raiva que demonstram um fator em comum: as atitudes agressivas da emoção acontecem quando a pessoa ou o grupo social possui pouca confiança de que a situação injusta -que suscitou a raiva -pode mudar.…”

“…Através das recentes e promissoras teses de Cherry (2021) e Silva (2020;2021), o debate normativo sobre a raiva pode começar a oferecer a devida relevância para o contexto político e social no qual a emoção surge, em vez de tratar da definição da raiva sem considerar esses moderadores contextuais. Ao compreender que a raiva e suas características podem variar de acordo com o contexto, podemos dar valor à raiva de pessoas que sofrem injustiças sociais e separar esse tipo de raiva -que é justificada e almeja justiça social -do tipo de raiva vingativa que leva a atitudes narcisistas e irracionais.…”