1984
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-17579-6
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Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939–1984

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Cited by 91 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…As shown elsewhere, Anglo-American co-operation in a number of highly sensitive areas continued despite British defence cuts, in particular, co-operation on Polaris and intelligence sharing. 11 However, what existing accounts have not highlighted is that the defence cuts were to have longer-term consequences. Most notably, when Callaghan succeeded Wilson as prime minister in April 1976 and confronted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis of 1976-1977, the tactic of threatening further defence cuts to achieve financial support from the United States proved ineffective.…”
Section: Thomas Robbmentioning
confidence: 96%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As shown elsewhere, Anglo-American co-operation in a number of highly sensitive areas continued despite British defence cuts, in particular, co-operation on Polaris and intelligence sharing. 11 However, what existing accounts have not highlighted is that the defence cuts were to have longer-term consequences. Most notably, when Callaghan succeeded Wilson as prime minister in April 1976 and confronted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis of 1976-1977, the tactic of threatening further defence cuts to achieve financial support from the United States proved ineffective.…”
Section: Thomas Robbmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…First, it challenges the notion that certain aspects of the "special relationship," namely nuclear and intelligence co-operation, remained sacrosanct. 8 To be sure this co-operation did continue. However what previous accounts have failed to illustrate is that this area of co-operation was used on multiple occasions by American policy-makers as a form of leverage in attempting to convince the British government to retain a greater commitment to defence spending.…”
Section: Thomas Robbmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…18 From the British perspective, the Thor proposal seemed attractive for a number of reasons. 19 Politically, the deal would enhance the restoration of ties with the United States and represent a concrete expression of confidence in that wider nuclear collaboration that had remained Britain's steadfast post-war goal. Certainly for the Prime Minister and his Defence Minister this was more important than any material measure of British independent control over Thor.…”
Section: Diplomacy and Statecraftmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 Sentimental attachments, cultural affinities, historical traditions, similarity in institutions and a common language have been rejected because the United States has such ties with other countries as well. 5 Even among supporters of a special relationship, it has been argued that the intimacy of the relationship formed during the Second World War was destroyed by the Suez debdcle, or the Cuban missile crisis, or the failure of Britain to give her support to the United States over Vietnam or by the decision by Britain to withdraw from East of Suez.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%