Animal Ethics Based on Friendship: An Aristotelian Perspective

Abstract

This article examines Aristotle's views concerning the possibility of friendship between human beings and nonhuman animals. The suggestion that he denies this possibility is rejected. I reassess the textual evidence adduced by scholars in support of this reading, while adding new material for discussion. Central to the traditional reading is the assumption that animals, in Aristotle's view, cannot be friends in virtue of their cognitive limitations. I argue that Aristotle's account of animal cognition is perfectly consistent with the possibility of friendship between human beings and nonhuman animals.

The Badness of Death for Sociable Cattle

“…Many ethicists argue that it is possible for humans and animals like cattle to become friends and that these friendships, or the possibility of these friendships, generate special reasons against eating, mistreating, objectifying, or killing some animals (proponents of views in this vicinity include [54], [55], [56], [57], [58]; cf. Torres [59], who argues that Aristotle is committed to this view, and Carter and Charles [60], who tackle the topic from a sociological perspective). Suffice to say that if captive cattle form friendships with humans (and this may not happen very often, see Causey [61]), then the fact that death destroys these friendships is probably another thing that makes death bad for cattle.…”