Animals and Moral Motivation: A Response to Clement

Rowlands, Jonathan

doi:10.5406/janimalethics.3.1.0015

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As such, the moral responsibility (and by extension, the agency) remains with the person who trained it. Rowlands (2013) also considers the concept of responsibility 3 as being central to the issue of agency, which he defines as: "X is a moral agent if and only if X is (a) morally responsible for, and so can be (b) morally evaluated (praised or blamed, broadly understood) for its motives and actions. "…”

Section: Morality In Non-human Animalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sexbots: a case for artificial ethical agents

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent years have seen significant developments in Artificial Intelligence and we are now beginning to see some applications applied to sexual technologies. This has led to certain individuals and groups calling for a ban on the development of artificial sexual companions or "sexbots". This is largely due to fears that commercialising sex in this way could could re-enforce existing gender inequalities, and sexual objectification. We argue that one possible risk mitigation strategy could be to develop ethical safeguards into sexual robots. In this paper we explore the problem of implementing artificial ethical agents through a review of the relevant literature. We begin by exploring the motivation to the problem, and the science fiction that has inspired it. Following this, the practical, and philosophical implementation challenges are discussed before providing an overview of the current state of the art. The paper concludes by introducing the grand challenges of the field. ARTICLE HISTORY

show abstract

Section: Morality In Non-human Animalsmentioning

confidence: 99%