Annas, Julia. <i>Intelligent Virtue</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 189. $85.00 (cloth).

Irwin, Terence

doi:10.1086/670200

Cited by 7 publications

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“… 48. See, for instance, Robinson (1953, 122); Sharples (1985, 1); Freidlander (1964, 276); Irwin (1996, 127); Thomas (1980, 11). …”

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confidence: 99%

Socrates, the primary question, and the unity of virtue

Clark

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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For Socrates, the virtues are a kind of knowledge, and the virtues form a unity. Sometimes, Socrates suggests that the virtues are all ‘one and the same’ thing. Other times, he suggests they are ‘parts of a single whole.’ I argue that (i) the ‘what is x?’ question is sophisticated, it gives rise to two distinct kinds of investigations into virtue, a conceptual investigation into the ousia and a psychological investigation into the dunamis, (ii) Plato recognized the difference between definitional accounts of the ousia and a psychological accounts of the dunamis, and (iii) the distinction between these two investigations can effectively resolve various interpretive puzzles regarding the unity of the virtues. It is argued that the virtues are ‘one and the same’ psychologically, while they are ‘parts of a single whole’ conceptually.

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“… 48. See, for instance, Robinson (1953, 122); Sharples (1985, 1); Freidlander (1964, 276); Irwin (1996, 127); Thomas (1980, 11). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socrates, the primary question, and the unity of virtue

Clark

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…8. I say that Irwin ‘ seems to be responding to something like my objection’ because his (1995) contains no reference to my (1991), where I explicitly raise, against the reading of Aristotle presented in his (1988), a version of this objection. His (1995) does however cite my (1986), but he cites it as if the view presented there were a version of the sort of rational egoism that he sees not only in Aristotle but also in the Symposium account of erôs (Irwin, 1995, 307). This citation is disconcerting given that my (1991) aimed explicitly to correct David Brink's (1991) assimilation of the view in my (1986) to the sort of rational egoism that Brink, following Irwin, attributes to Aristotle.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…10. See Irwin (1995) 304, which suggests that the Phaedrus clarifies the connections he sees between the Republic and the Symposium ; and 306, where Irwin says:In the Phaedrus Plato combines his different claims about eros in the Republic and the Symposium. He insists that, as the Symposium claims, one sort of eros belongs to the rational part.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…See Irwin (1995) 304, which suggests that the Phaedrus clarifies the connections he sees between the Republic and the Symposium ; and 306, where Irwin says:…”

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confidence: 99%

“…the person in whom I propagate these [valuable] aspects of myself need not be me in the future; it may be another person who already exists now. I can therefore achieve what I value about intrapersonal propagation if I propagate these aspects of myself in another person ; if I value intrapersonal propagation, I ought to value interpersonal propagation … Since I cannot always preserve myself, I must seek to propagate the valuable aspects of myself in other people (Irwin, 1995, 306).…”

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Love: self-propagation, self-preservation, orekstasis?

Whiting

2013

Can. J. of Philosophy

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My title refers to three accounts of interpersonal love: the rationalist (and ultimately rational egoist) account that Terence Irwin ascribes to Plato; the anti-rationalist but strikingly similar account that Harry Frankfurt endorses in his own voice; and the 'ekstatic' account that I -following the lead of Martha Nussbaum -find in Plato's Phaedrus. My claim is that the ekstatic account points to important features of interpersonal love to which the other accounts fail to do justice, especially reciprocity and a regulative ideal of equality.

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Plato on Virtuous Leadership: An Ancient Model for Modern Business

Bauman

2018

Bus. Ethics Q.

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ABSTRACT:The business ethics and leadership literature has paid little attention to the analysis of virtue in the Socratic dialogues, but Plato’s account of virtue and persuasion offer relevant insights for business leaders. In the Republic, Plato’s description of five types of leaders offers a new perspective on leadership selection and development using the moral psychology of both virtuous and non-virtuous leaders. In this article, I explain Plato’s account of virtue and knowledge, his three-part moral psychology, the four cardinal virtues that virtuous leaders develop, and his continuum of five leader types. I apply Plato’s model to leadership issues in today’s corporate world and explain how the model can guide leaders, board members, and investors.

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Annas, Julia. Intelligent Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 189. $85.00 (cloth).

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Socrates, the primary question, and the unity of virtue

Socrates, the primary question, and the unity of virtue

Love: self-propagation, self-preservation, orekstasis?

Plato on Virtuous Leadership: An Ancient Model for Modern Business

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