2010
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_21
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Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability

Abstract: Abstract. Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we resolve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and election result. We first provide a conceptual model which captures anonymity as well as verifiability. Second… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…There are different ways to verify the security aspects in a voting protocol like the modular approach, epistemic logic, probabilistic approaches and probabilistic or nondeterministic approach. One of the best ways to verify whether these requirements are satisfied is by using process calculus.…”
Section: Preliminariesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are different ways to verify the security aspects in a voting protocol like the modular approach, epistemic logic, probabilistic approaches and probabilistic or nondeterministic approach. One of the best ways to verify whether these requirements are satisfied is by using process calculus.…”
Section: Preliminariesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…e-Voting systems need to assure privacy and integrity so that the balance can be shifted towards the ones who vote. Two important principles need to find their place in such systems: privacy, meaning the votes should be easily verified [13,14], without compromising voter's identity [15], and integrity, meaning once the votes are cast, the systems should not allow for them to be changed.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Both approaches are process-oriented and thus, not suitable for a CC evaluation. In Langer (2010), a state-oriented view is given by describing security properties of privacy and receipt-freeness. A different, state-oriented formalization of receipts and receipt-freeness is provided in Jonker and de Vink (2006) by characterizing properties of receipts.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%