Anthropocentrism is not the first step in children’s reasoning about the natural world

Abstract

What is the relation between human and nonhuman animals? As adults, we construe this relation flexibly, depending in part on the situation at hand. From a biological perspective, we acknowledge the status of humans as one species among many (as in Western science), but at the same time may adopt other perspectives, including an anthropocentric perspective in which human characteristics are attributed to nonhuman animals (as in fables and popular media). How do these perspectives develop? The predominant view in developmental cognitive science is that young children universally possess only one markedly anthropocentric vantage point, and must undergo fundamental conceptual change, overturning their initially human-centered framework before they can acquire a distinctly biological framework. Evidence from two experiments challenges this view. By developing a task that allows us to test children as young as 3 years of age, we are able to demonstrate that anthropocentrism is not the first developmental step in children’s reasoning about the biological world. Although urban 5-year-olds adopt an anthropocentric perspective, replicating previous reports, 3-year-olds show no hint of anthropocentrism. This suggests a previously unexplored model of development: Anthropocentrism is not an initial step in conceptual development, but is instead an acquired perspective, one that emerges between 3 and 5 years of age in children raised in urban environments.

Experiencing nature and children’s conceptualizations of the natural world

“…Researchers generally agree that children's concept of nature may not be universal and that several factors account for its variability. Age, language, culture, gender, place of residence and time spent in outdoor settings have been highlighted as significant influences on children's conceptualization of nature (Anggoro, Waxman, and Medin 2008, Atran et al 2001, Herrmann et al 2010, Unsworth et al 2012. Interestingly, how close a child feels to the natural world seems to account for variability in the concept of nature (Inagaki andHatano 2002, Medin et al 2010).…”

“…These include assessing children's moral reasoning about different environmental problems (Kahn, 1999) or evaluating whether children think of humans as similar to other living beings (mainly animals) (Carey 1985, Herrmann, Waxman, and Medin 2010, Levin and Unsworth 2013. Researchers generally agree that children's concept of nature may not be universal and that several factors account for its variability.…”

Anthropocentric by Default? Attribution of Familiar and Novel Properties to Living Things

“…It involves extending one's biological knowledge to other living and non-living things, based on their perceived similarity to humans. For example, one would be more likely to attribute a heart or the ability to think to a lion than to an ant, because a lion is seen as being more similar to a human than an ant is (Carey, 1985;Coley et al, 2017;Hermann, Waxman, & Medin, 2010;Inagaki, 1990;Inagaki & Hatano, 1991;Inagaki & Sugiyama, 1988;Ross, Medin, Coley, & Atran, 2003). Anthropocentric thinking has not been as widely studied as teleological or essentialist thinking, and there are conflicting theories as to its developmental trajectory and role in intuitive biological thought.…”

“…They conclude that "culturally-held belief systems within the community appear to influence children's reasoning about biological phenomena" (p. 9). Likewise, Hermann et al (2010) modified Carey's (1985 induction task to test children as young as three, and found that those 3-year-olds showed no preferential bias toward humans as an inferential base, suggesting a striking lack of anthropocentric thought as compared to their 5-year-old counterparts. These findings, taken together, suggest that anthropocentrism may not be a developmentally persistent cognitive default, but rather may be a culturally influenced cognitive strategy acquired later in development.…”

Young infants have biological expectations about animals

“…When asked whether a pig has the same kinds of insides as a cow or a piggy bank, for example, 3-y-olds are more likely to select the cow (3). Similarly, when told that dogs have "andro" inside, 3-y-olds are more likely to project this novel property to other animals (including mammals and nonmammals) than to artifacts (11).…”