Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb Corruption?

Exploring the Dynamics of Delegation Over Time: Insights from Italian Anti‐Corruption Agencies (2003–2016)

“…In the context of state failure or construction, ACAs have been set up by donors and international pressure (Doig, ). In other cases, these bodies have been set up as an attempt to upgrade the country's ethical infrastructure, or simply to fulfill obligations deriving from the signing of international anti‐bribery conventions (Recanatini, ).…”

Political will and government anti‐corruption efforts: What does the evidence say?

“…This is further corroborated by Francesca Recanatini's finding after studying the effectiveness of anti‐corruption efforts in seven countries as part of a World Bank project. She reported that although strong political support from a country's leadership is the most critical factor to the effectiveness of anti‐corruption efforts, it is not a sufficient condition; and that in order to promote change, there is the need for middle management and bureaucratic support (Recanatini, ).…”

Political Economy of Reform

“…Why cannot countries solve this problem by instituting anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), as in the case of Singapore, which would monitor and prosecute the "askers" of bribes among politicians and bureaucrats in government? A number of case studies have examined the experience with anti-corruption reforms in poor countries, including the establishment of ACAs, and found that they fail because of weak incentives among powerful political leaders to reduce corruption (Meagher, 2005;Doig et al, 2006;Recanatini, 2011;Heeks and Mathison, 2012;Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Why would there be weak political incentives to reduce corruption, 7 given the substantial efficiency and equity costs of corruption that has been documented by research (Olken and Pande, 2012, provide a review)?…”

“…After reviewing the available and future directions for research, the paper concludes with what is little evidence on what formal public institutions should be adopted that would sustainably reduce corruption by strengthening incentives against it. 4 Critical reviews of the experience with anti-corruption agencies are provided by Meagher (2005), Doig et al (2006), Recanatini (2011), Heeks andMathison (2012), andMungiu-Pippidi (2015). all of this means for policy-makers interested in understanding the factors behind successful reforms.…”