Anti-exceptionalism, truth and the BA-plan

Abstract

Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST-based hierarchy, of which LP and ST themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP, ST and the logics of the ST-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains (just like classical logic)? From an antiexceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST-metainferential logics in general-and STT ω in particular-are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth.

Translating Metainferences Into Formulae

“…Let us begin with the first of these inadequacies. As [8] have argued, the formulation above does not interpret metainferences, in general, and the above instance of Cut, in particular, as mixed metainferential theories favour (particularly given that they can be impure at metainferential levels). In the example above, the right conditional would read as follows: if each premise of (the instance of) Cut is valid according to ST, then the conclusion is valid according to ST. Or again, more formally, that if Γ TS/ST ∆ then (if ST Γ, then ST δ) (since the inferences in the right conditional are of level 1 and thus have to be valid according to the conclusion standard of TS/ST).…”

Una revisión de la noción de coherencia desde la perspectiva de la lógica definida como secuencia de nociones de consecuencia

“…En este contexto, el programa de investigación llamado "BA-Plan", liderado por Eduardo Barrio, se propone defender que cierta lógica metainferencial (a la que definiremos más adelante como SK st w ) es mejor opción que cualquiera de las lógicas inferenciales no clásicas (por ejemplo, LP) como teorías de la verdad transparente (cf. Barrio, Pailos & Toranzo Calderón, 2021). De acuerdo con BA-Plan, las metainferencias no representan solamente propiedades metalógicas de una lógica inferencial, sino que ellas mismas, en cuanto conjuntos de inferencias, constituyen lógicas de pleno derecho.…”

Normatividad y pluralismo en los estudios sobre el razonamiento humano

“…Siguiendo esta idea, ni los modelos ni las idealizaciones inherentes a los modelos están libres de posibles revisiones. Es decir, los sistemas formales también pueden ser revisados (Barrio, Pailos y Toranzo, 2021). Por esto, la cuestión de la adecuación de los sistemas formales en cuanto estándares para el razonamiento humano requiere tener en cuenta la conformidad con los datos empíricos obtenidos a partir de la experimentación.…”