Anticipatory and reactive forms of blame avoidance: of foxes and lions

Abstract

Blame avoidance behavior (BAB) encompasses all kinds of integrity-protecting activities by officeholders in the face of potentially blame-attracting events. Although considered essential for a realistic understanding of politics and policymaking, a general understanding of this multi-faceted behavioral phenomenon and its implications has been lacking to date. We argue that this is due to the lack of careful conceptualization of various forms of BAB. Crucially, the difference between anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB is largely neglected in the literature. This paper links anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB as two consecutive decision situations. It exposes dependence relationships between the situations that trigger BAB, the rationalities at work, the resources and strategies applied by blame-avoiding actors, and the various consequences thereof. The paper concludes that anticipatory and reactive BAB are distinct phenomena that require specific research approaches to assess their relevance for the workings of polities.

Blame‐shifting in Times of Permanent Austerity: Evidence from Spain and Greece in the Eurozone Crisis

“…Weaver and others have translated this basic idea into more complex sets of political behaviour, the politics of blame avoidance . Blame avoidance behaviour constitutes the activities conducted to protect an individual or collective reputation in the face of situations that can potentially attract blame (Hinterleitner and Sager, , p. 587).…”

“…Anticipatory forms prepare for future blame‐attracting developments; they focus on the political process and target the organization and design of policies. Reactive forms deal with past and current blame‐attracting situations and target a public audience (Hinterleitner and Sager, ). To protect an actor's reputation in the public quest for responsibility, political authorities invest in influencing public perceptions of how responsible political actors are for unpopular outcomes by means of political communication (Wenzelburger, , p. 1158).…”

Errors have been made, others will be blamed: Issue engagement and blame shifting in prime minister speeches during the economic crisis in Europe

“…Many of the blame avoidance strategies examined in the literature concern the way policies are enacted (or not). The different strategies discussed involve, on the one hand, the choice of policies or procedures that minimize blame or the compensation of losers of retrenching reforms (policy strategies) and, on the other hand, change of institutional arrangements to delegate responsibility to different actors (agency strategies) (Weaver 1986;Pierson 1994;Hood 2002;Hood 2010;Mortensen 2012;Vis 2016;Hinterleitner and Sager 2017). However, in a context of crisis, neither agency strategies nor policy strategies are a likely option.…”

“…Changing institutional procedures takes time, and policy choices are severely constrained, since all governments are forced to implement budget cuts one way or another. 8 In these "negative-sum" policy situations (Weaver 1986), a third type of blame avoidance strategiespresentational strategies -become important (Hood 2002;Hood 2010, Hood et al 2016Hinterleitner and Sager 2017;Hansson 2018). 9 Such a presentational strategy might entail blame shifting to other countries or supranational institutions.…”

“…In a more general discussion of the literature,Hinterleitner and Sager (2017) distinguish between "anticipatory" and "reactive blame avoidance". They argue that in a situation in which an event has become publicly visible and blameworthy, actors have to play the "reactive blame game".…”